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Introduction
At the end of the American Civil War, the U.S. federal government found itself with new
grand powers in its final victory over the Confederacy. The Union had survived the fires of war
from 1861 to 1865, the bloodiest in American history.1 In the final days of the war, General Ulysses
Grant described his purpose for several triumphal marches north with his Union armies:
“The march of Sherman’s army from Atlanta to the sea and north to Goldsboro… It had an
important bearing… of closing the war. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly,
however, the minds of the Southern people became disabused, and they saw the true state
of affairs. In turn, they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without
compromise.”2
The conventional part of the Civil War was ending and soon bringing Reconstruction, which
concentrated on reintegrating the South politically and economically into the Union.
Reconstruction aimed to mend the effects of the war, which had destroyed the South’s economy,
with the additional aim to help the millions of the now-freed former slaves. As the Civil War’s
conventional phase ended, the North believed the war had reached a successful conclusion.
As Carl Von Clausewitz expressed, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”3
Directly following the Civil War, the South realized that it could not maintain their political aim
of white supremacy in a conventional war or immediate overt political maneuvers, and they would

“Civil War Casualties.” American Battlefield Trust, August 24, 2021.
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now turn to a long war of insurgency. This insurgent phase first manifested with John Wilkes
Boothe, who on April 14th, 1865, assassinated President Abraham Lincoln.4 Booth had developed
a plan to kill all the heads of the federal government with the aim to leave the federal government
in political chaos. Unknown to the North, a new phase of the Civil War had begun in the form of
a Southern insurgency.
The insurgency war came out of an amorphous association of returning home Confederate
veterans, who reorganized themselves into networks of loosely connected militias. At times, nearly
entire reconstitutions of Confederate battalions reformed.5 The most infamous of the insurgent
groups was the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), derived from the Greek word “kyklos,” meaning circle.6
The KKK started an invisible empire of the South striving to intimidate, terrorize, brutalize, and
kill newly freed African Americans who participated in politics as well as white people who
supported these efforts. KKK members attacked schools, churches, and homes of those involved.
These terror tactics successfully cemented a solely white dominance in the South, which
perpetuated white superiority in economics and politics. By 1901, the last African American
Congressman, Henry White, gave his farewell speech to the House of Representatives, expressing
how the South had reversed the political and societal progress experienced by the African
American community in the post-Civil War period through this terror campaign of crime and
murder.7
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At the beginning of Reconstruction, Washington D.C. became aware of the growing
terrorism in the South from the networks of the KKK, federal leadership took steps to deal with
the insurgency, and President Grant would choose to increase federal troops in the South to their
highest level. He authorized the use of more aggressive counterinsurgency tactics and militarized
Reconstruction by turning the South into five military districts garrisoned with Army units of
infantry and calvary. At times, Grant allowed the suspension of habeas corpus, allowing federal
troops to arrest anyone suspected of KKK involvement, who could be held without charge, and if
necessary, held indefinitely. Though by the 1870s, a core American failure in counterinsurgency
implementation emerged, the American public opinion quickly waned for the continued
militarized operations, which can be gauged by the way the American public voted. The public
vote swayed to the Democrat party, with many southern members in their ranks. This public turn
moved the political agenda away from the militarized Reconstruction: “The number of Federal
troops stationed in the South dropped from 87,000 in 1866 to 20,000 in 1867 and 6,000 in 1876.”8
As the American public’s will weakened for fighting a prolonged counterinsurgency, white
supremacist militias were able to endure in the South.
The Congressional mid-terms of 1874 brought a Democrat majority to the House of
Representatives for the first time since the Civil War. When this happened, President Grant’s
militarized Reconstruction efforts stalled.9 Grant became politically isolated as Southern
Democrats returned, and many northerners turned away from the idea of a continued federal
military presence to handle the Southern insurgencies. In September of 1875, President Grant
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received a request from Governor Ames of Mississippi, asking for federal troops to be sent to
Mississippi to aid in subduing white racial violence.10 Grant refused, fearing that more troops in
the South would turn Americans away from the Republican party in the upcoming 1876 elections.
President Grant knew, as did the returning white Southern Democrats in D.C., that the American
public had moved passed the Civil War and waging a continued counterinsurgency effort in the
South was politically unpopular. By 1877, federal troops were gone, and the South had won the
insurgent war and now entered into a near hundred-year long unchecked reign of terror on African
Americans and allied Whites who sought equality in law, economics, and politics.
My objective is to explain the creation of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency doctrine,
which I contend is made in conjunction with the American public, the federal government, and the
U.S. military leadership. This American counterinsurgency doctrine creation has undergone
periodic transformations that I highlight to shine a clear light on this three-way conversation of
creating U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, which is not reliant on the battlefield requirements. U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine evolved out of this tumultuous three-way conversation, with a
reoccurring theme of the federal government’s repeated failure to understand this societal
conversation. The U.S. federal government repeatedly desired short conventional wars, failing to
understand post-war counterinsurgency operation requirements and the American public’s
powerful role in guaranteeing the success or failure of such operations. I will show this reoccurring
American phenomenon in Reconstructions failure, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, and the
Iraq war following the 2003 invasion.

Melissa Jones. “The Clinton Riot of 1875: From Riot to Massacre.” Mississippi Department of
History & Archives, September 2015. https://www.mshistorynow.mdah.ms.gov/issue/theclinton-riot-of-1875-from-riot-to-massacre.
10
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Returning to Reconstruction, the Union had won the conventional war only to lose the postwar peace. After the Civil War, the federal government had grown drastically in power, size, and
ability to wage a grand conventional war, yet the South won the long war of peace through the use
of an exhausting insurgency. Networks of terror cells in the South dramatically outnumbered the
limited capabilities of the continually dwindling U.S. Army in the South. The South’s insurgent
networks worked hand-in-hand with the Democratic political leadership to produce the political
win they desired and create a legal system of racial segregation in the South, cementing white
supremacist rule in the legal code of Jim Crow laws in the South, which delayed the goals of
Reconstruction until the mid-twentieth century with the rise of the Civil Rights Movement.
Counterinsurgency is an ancient tool used by various militaries in governing internal
sectors and external territorial claims. As early city-states began to expand their political influence
over wider realms outside their original territory, insurgency movements developed in these newly
dominated foreign political spheres. Pulling my Webster’s thesaurus off the bookshelf, it defines
“insurgency” as “open fighting against authority (as one’s own government).”11 The thesaurus uses
the same definition for insurgents, who are “rebelling” against the political sovereign over an area.
A study of counter-rebellion does not have the same ring to it as the name of counterinsurgency,
nor does it have the stinging rebuke for the so-called rebels. Because Americans love to root for
an underdog, the language must be worded carefully to mark enemies. By labeling enemies as
insurgents, Americans often align them with terrorists or terrorism. Even the American Revolution
was labeled a rebellion (insurgency), although they rebranded themselves as patriots. Defining

11

Laird Charlton, Webster's New Thesaurus (Cleveland: Wiley Publishing, 2005), 338.

6
terms is particularly important because many of these words are carelessly used today in the public
and media and are poorly understood.
The aim here is to explain the creation of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency doctrine
and the unique three-way conversation of the American public with the political and military
leadership, who together formed existing U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine throughout American
history. I analyze this conversation creating doctrine by using declassified government documents,
official military analyses, U.S. military field manuals, and politician statements and memoirs in
conjunction with military leaders’ statements and news articles at that time.
I do not always agree with the U.S. actions or condone them. My research began with two
monumental counterinsurgency manuals: the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Small Wars
Manual (1921) and the U.S. Army’s 3-24 Field Manual Counterinsurgency (2006) published for
the Iraq Surge; however, I found these manuals to be incomplete regarding the elements brining
about their creation. My search took me far beyond both military manuals, forcing me to grapple
with the American public’s influence, lack of government leadership, and accountability and to
research the United States’ foundation. This process required an analytical approach into
understanding the relationship of the American public’s attitude during each conflict examined, its
leadership, election results, and the current politics of that day.
Outline
Chapter One
The first chapter traces the foundational works that set the U.S. on a course to dramatically
expand to the West. This blueprint of a nation was a British-lite empire mirrored after the Roman
and Venetian Republics. The U.S. experienced forms of counterinsurgency campaigns with the
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Native American tribes, who found themselves in the growing political sphere of U.S. dominance.
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines were not written into a formal military field manual but were
instead passed down through military experience. Local commanders were left to learn and
produce their own fighting styles and doctrines. Developing U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was
not a cohesive approach.
Chapter Two
As the US became a multi-continent empire after the Spanish-American War, the
Philippines required the U.S. to manage counterinsurgency operations on a global scope. Two
different campaigns occurred in the Philippines, a northern and southern campaign, requiring the
U.S. military to deal with new insurgency types. Unlike in the American West, a white settler class
was not near to aid the U.S. military operations. The U.S. military learned how to build indigenous
assistance to dismantle the insurgent movements. Crucially, the American public supported overt
American imperialism at this time, which was witnessed in the election and reelection of Presidents
William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. Despite scrutiny against these U.S. military
campaigns; the anti-imperialist criticism was not strong enough to change the political setting.
After World War One and in the depths of the Great Depression, the U.S. reexamined its imperial
role in the world.
Chapter Three
This chapter investigates the Vietnam War, which included an Americanization of the war,
which means that the U.S. prosecuted the war on its own effort with increased war material and
troop strength. This approach is termed a heavy “boot print” for U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine
due to the country’s focus on conventional force strategy and tactics using large conventional troop
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deployments. As U.S. military operations grew in Vietnam, the U.S. news media and American
public became growingly critical of prolonged U.S. military operations due to mounting U.S.
casualties and seemingly endless conflict. The American public sentiment was tied to the receding
desire of being a global empire, which was heavily critiqued by the political Left, the Soviet Union,
and the American anti-war movement. Although the U.S. government held the media’s approval
for a time, this changed with the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet offensive, which altered the media’s
perception, including counterinsurgency styles used against the Viet Cong. In addition, it was
believed that the South Vietnamese government was not willing to fight for themselves due to
corruption and low morale. With news outlets reporting on the war and discontent for the draft
daily, the American public moved politically to end the conflict post Tet offensive. By 1968, the
U.S. federal government understood the American public’s disdain for the Vietnamese
counterinsurgency efforts; and sustaining the war was politically impossible.
Chapter Four
This chapter highlights U.S. military operations in El Salvador from 1977 to 1992. During
these operations, the U.S. military made a counterinsurgency doctrinal change from Vietnam, by
using an exceptionally “light boot print” focused on small deployments of Army Green Beret units
that were used to train, equip, and supplement the El Salvadorans capabilities. At this point, the
U.S. and the Soviet Union were the only global empires, and the media paid close attention to their
military actions. The Soviet operations in Afghanistan were strongly criticized by media outlets,
forcing the U.S. to carefully walk a fine line of fighting a war as humanely as possible in El
Salvador. This strategy would fail. In the Salvadoran conflict, a U.S. troop “light boot print” was
created and centered on arming and training the host nation’s forces. This approach went go awry,
and the war led to a slaughtering of civilians by forces under direct U.S. military support and
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guidance. A light footprint was found to be lacking in El Salvador as well. Driven by a new fear
of a communist invasion, the American public desired to be tough on communist groups but did
not want the American military linked to genocidal operations. At the same time, they did not want
large troop deployments to the El Salvadoran conflict. This U.S. military failure compelled a new
evolutionary change in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, seeking to align more with the American
public will.
Chapter Five
This chapter is focused on the American troop surge to Iraq in 2006 to 2007, which
occurred at the last moments of the height of American military and global imperial preeminence.
The surge was a new form of counterinsurgency in a population-centric doctrine. The new doctrine
had American troops live in neighborhoods that they patrolled in an effort to win the local populace
through a sense of protection, respect, and community reconciliation. The U.S. military
encouraged Iraqis to provide intelligence on the insurgent networks through local security gains
and payment incentives. The surge brought an appropriate presence of a U.S. military boot print
that was not too heavy or too light, but just right. This approach produced an effective
counterinsurgency doctrine centered on effective local governance, proper policing, and separating
the Iraqi population from the insurgent networks, which was based on building an American troop
core backing the Iraqi troop presence. The surge allowed for Iraqi troops to gain experience,
morale, and to feel responsible for their nation’s success while being properly paid, observed, and
supported by American military troop partnerships. Crucially, the American public supported the
Iraq war effort post 9/11 through a desire to be tough on international terror networks; however,
political pressures in D.C. forced changing the Iraq war’s counterinsurgency efforts in 2006 due
to the war’s post-invasion chaos. These events brought the counterinsurgency doctrinal movement
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to the U.S. troop surge and population-centric strategy. Driven by this time period witnessing the
apex of news media scrutiny on U.S. counterinsurgency operations, generating a quick turn around
on altering tactics and strategies for the better.
Final Thoughts
The closing chapter describes the new phase of counterinsurgency challenges the U.S. is
in post-2007. After the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Russia quickly expanded its
political and military operations globally.12 Russia then entered the global war of
counterinsurgency operations in competition to the U.S., witnessed in Syria, Libya, and the Central
African Republic. France returned to the global scene with its military operations across much of
its former colonies in North and Central Africa in the Sahel. China has made a resurgence as well,
having built military bases in Djibouti, Pakistan, and across the South China Sea in an effort to
expand its military umbrella. China has grown in international preeminence from its “One Belt,
One Road Initiative.” China has not openly engaged its forces in military counterinsurgency
conflicts globally; instead, it has turned its efforts internally. It has aided other allies in crushing
internal insurgencies, such as Myanmar.
As France, Russia, and China have entered military counterinsurgency operations globally,
the U.S. is now finding its own counterinsurgency doctrine is one of many again. This will now
require the U.S. to market its counterinsurgency doctrines internationally to both its allies and
competitors and I contend, to the American public. The alternative is to continue to watch the
world turn to far harsher counterinsurgency tactics and strategies of the gruesome past.

Tony Harris. “Russian Invasion: Aid Shipments Arrive in Georgia; Pentagon Press
Conference; Refugee Camp Being Set Up Outside of Tbilisi.” CNN. August 14, 2008.
https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/cnr/date/2008-08-14/segment/03.
12
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With the global dilemmas of emerging competitors, developing nations, and stabilizing
failed states, the importance of effective counterinsurgency doctrine is crucial to prevent vast sums
of bloodshed in these unstable environments. This is not only essential for the U.S. and her partners
but for global stability. Developing and marketing successful counterinsurgency doctrines at home
and abroad, even to non-allies, may help those powers less inclined to human rights concerns to
lessen their use of brutal forms of counterinsurgency tactics and the use of annihilation type
doctrines. As seen in Aleppo, by the actions of Syrian and Russian forces, and by Chinese actions
in the mass relocation to concentration camps of the Uighur Muslim populations.
New counterinsurgency studies will help the U.S. understand the political, sociological,
cultural, and economic importance of insurgent conflicts. Even if these conflicts appear not to
affect the U.S. outright, they do effect America’s long-term interests and its allies from conflicts
changes in mass-migration patterns and global market instability. Proper counterinsurgency
doctrine is necessary to create global initiatives that can successfully intervene in failing states to
prevent killing zones, as the world saw in Yugoslavia’s breakup or Syria’s recent civil war and the
insurgent conflicts that induced famines in Somalia. The goal of creating long-term success
through proper counterinsurgency doctrines within nations with complex ethnic and religious
backgrounds is imperative. This can be compared to the results of military frustration in such
operations, which can lead to population annihilation as seen in the current conflict of Yemen.
Global conflicts are continuing and are increasingly connected through globalization, which has
allowed the proliferation of globally coordinated and connected insurgent networks to destabilize
on a wider global scale. The world needs further evolution in developing U.S. counterinsurgency
doctrine, which I consider to be hinged on winning over the American public.
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Chapter 1
A National Foundation and Mission

“The United States has in fact adhered to a well-defined grand strategy… to preserve and,
where feasible and conducive to U.S. interests, expand an American Imperium. Central to this
strategy is a commitment to global openness - removing barriers that inhibit the movement of
goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated
international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the
ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.”13
Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire

The United States of America was conceived by its founders with ideas coming out of the
Enlightenment Era. They believed that white men who were independent, freely associated, welleducated, and financially secure could govern themselves in a republic. After the American
Revolutionary War, the founders saw that the originally agreed on Articles of Confederation were
failing the new nation. The Articles of Confederation’s Congress could pass laws but lacked the
federal power to enforce these laws, and this federal weakness sowed conflict between the thirteen
states, which acted as competing nations. The American founders aimed to develop a singular
national unity with economic interdependence and a powerful functioning federal government.
The founders wanted to present a new, unifying goal for the American states, which on both sides
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of the political aisle accepted; the goal of building a new type of American empire would now
unify the new nation going forward.
The U.S. was modeled after the eighteenth-century world and ancient republics. The
founders attempted to navigate the imperial theme of the day, which implied that countries could
become an empire or be devoured by one. The Federalist Papers, written by John Jay, Alexander
Hamilton, and James Madison, shares a series of arguments for their version of the future of the
United States federal government. In The Federalist Papers No. fourteen written by James
Madison, he openly spoke of the U.S. becoming a global empire, expressed as a lofty goal.
Madison states:
“Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit
together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members
of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness;
can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable and flourishing empire! Hearken
not to the voice which petulantly tells you that.”14
For this empire to be built, a strong federal government would be necessary. Alexander Hamilton,
in The Federalist Papers No. seventeen expounds:
“Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require…
Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have
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charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects
ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository.”15
The question of empire building directed by a federal government was not debated by Hamilton
or Madison, just what route to take.
The Federalists Papers argue for developing a commercial-based imperium with less focus
on the goal of acquiring territory. The papers expound on building large industries to generate
wealth, with small outposts of holdings spread internationally, which involves ideas reflecting the
Venetian Republic. The Federalist reasoned that avoiding land accumulation would prevent
America from being plunged continually into a European-styled history of perpetual land wars.
The Federalists envisioned a trade empire reflecting the British empire, where controlling the sea
lanes with a large navy was crucial to success. Hamilton continually referenced Athens, Venice,
and Rome, showing his inspirational sources. Hamilton expressed how: “Athens, Rome, Carthage
were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind”16 were built largely
on naval dominance. Drawing upon the examples of past democracies and republics, the
Federalists shared their ambition to improve and perfect this form of governance in order to
achieve longevity in the new American empire.
Today, many believe that the founders’ idea of building a democratic republic resulted
from such governance styles being largely peaceful and targeting coexistence more than war,
which deviates from the described aim of the American Republic. The American federal
government's expansion is envisioned and is understood to require war. The use of political and

Alexander Hamilton. “Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History:
Federalist Nos. 11-20.” Research Guides: Library of Congress. Accessed October 11, 2021.
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-11-20.
16
Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 25.
15
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economic force and distinct types of military troop deployments were all meant to claim a place
in the world for the newly envisioned American commercial empire. The expansion of territory
would at times require conventional wars. One of the leading Federalists, President George
Washington, created an iconic quote in his first annual address to the American congress.
Washington stated that, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving
peace.”17 He understood personally from battlefield experience that militias were a fickle force
and what was needed by the nation was a stable and professional military. This professional
military was primarily for the purposes of preventing rival empires from invading the new
American empire, clearly seen in the War of 1812. A professional military was needed to secure
the vision of the Federalists in their expanding port empire along with international commercial
growth and recognition. Hamilton argued intensely for this approach, viewing small wars and
military growth as required to establishing the U.S. international prestige among the global empires
of the 18th-century world.
This imperial mindset was not in the Federalists alone. Thomas Jefferson, a DemocratRepublican who was starkly against a federal government, advocated a separate way to an
American Empire. He called on the U.S. to become an “Empire of Liberty,”18 one that would be
formed by the American masses spreading West, spearheaded by the “yeoman farmers,” which
would spread the ideals of republicanism and liberty.19 In turn, the vast population boom of these
farmers would generate and regenerate new republics throughout North America. As these
republics grew, they would come to be united into the nation as states. This idea of growth and

George Washington, “First Annual Address to Congress.” The American Presidency Project,
January 8, 1790. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/first-annual-address-congress-0.
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University Press of Virginia, 2001), 2.
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regeneration of republics was explained as a peaceful form of generating an empire for the U.S.,
believing the Native Americans would come into awe at the principles and wisdom of American
culture and Republicanism and then join freely into the nation. This idea would then lead to the
peaceful absorption of Native American tribes into the U.S. and expand the nation’s political,
regional, and global reach. Jefferson envisioned the U.S. expanding from coast to coast. This
empire of liberty was an American imperium but more idealistic or fantastical, than the Federalists’
visions.
The Federalists saw national expansion as requiring war, military development, commerce,
and national banking. Democratic-Republicans saw a more idealistic development of American
imperialism through the spreading of American population growth, which would introduce the
superior or unrefusable American culture, democracy, and individualism. Both visions saw empire
as the American dream and both espoused expanding America’s power regionally and globally as
the unifying national aim; however, a glaring oversight in both these visions of American
expansion persists into the American political, public, and often military psyche today. What if in
the expansion of the American empire it is resisted by local populations? What if conventional
war, culture, and the principles of democracy fail to win over or pacify new U.S. territories and
internationally politically controlled areas? From the outset of the nation, the founders dreamed of
an empire but ignored the necessary role of counterinsurgency in it.
During each generation of the American public, political and military leaders have had to
grapple with unwanted long-term insurgent wars, after they have won a conventional war. For the
U.S. was designed to want quick conventional fights but faltered in understanding that these
conventional wars required long post-war pacification operations, which are required to make the
new territories truly cemented into U.S. political hands. These small wars were lengthy, and at
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times multiple decades long, which became confusing to the American populace, and overtime,
these small wars have eaten away at the American people’s will for the responsibilities of holding
a global empire.
The resentment of military deaths, treasury costs, and growing scrutiny of the brutality of
empire, would mount, which we will see more in the twentieth century. Empire shifted from being
a positive event and national pride, to now, a time of global political and national distancing from
empire. This shift brought about a new narrative for the U.S., which had to explain its role in the
world to their citizens. In essence, it was hiding an empire and reshaping how it executed its role
in dealing with global counterinsurgency operations.
Returning to the post-Civil War American expansion westward, a series of Indian Wars
caused the U.S. Army to develop strategies and tactics of counterinsurgency, which would develop
forward into the 20th century. Historian and U.S. Army Captain John G. Bourke wrote about his
firsthand experiences in these first insurgent wars for the U.S. with the Apache and Cheyenne. In
1876, he accompanied General Ranald Mackenzie in a winter campaign in Wyoming against the
Cheyenne. The U.S. Army by this point had learned several keys to turn an invisible guerrilla army
visible by using capable local Native American scouts. The intelligence gathered helped give
“sight” to U.S. forces to see the invisible fighters. Sioux warriors played a leading role in this
campaign, with “hundreds of young warriors enlisted as scouts,” with large numbers of motivated
Shoshone.20 Many Shoshone had a deep hatred of the Cheyenne, as some were former slaves to
the Cheyenne and had experienced a litany of abuses. Due to their speed, capabilities, and
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environmental knowledge, the Indian scouts were crucial to successfully finding the Cheyenne.21
Once the U.S. Army was able to reliably recruit various Indian Scouts, its counterinsurgent
campaigns became an overwhelming success.
Indian Scouts acted as an external ring around the U.S. Army forces, forming both an early
warning system for Cheyenne attacks and scouting ahead. Once the Indian Scouts had found an
enemy force, “the calvary, under Mackenzie, could be pushed forward to strike a sharp, decisive
blow upon anything not beyond its ability to handle, or… could fall back behind the infantry
following more slowly behind.”22 Bourke gave his highest praise to the logistical lines of the mule
trains that supplied the Army and wrote that “there was a train of one hundred and sixty wagons
and seven ambulances, with two hundred and nineteen drivers and attendants, and a pack train of
four hundred mules cared by sixty-five expert packers,” that kept the Army supplied and enabled
the continued fighting and pursuit of the insurgent forces.23 During the winter, the Cheyenne
insurgents chronically lacked supplies because they were accustomed to living off the land. The
weather in Wyoming dramatically restricted their movements to pre-established villages holding
their limited supplies. The U.S. Army knew that finding these nodes of supply were fundamental
to ending the resistance.
Bourke describes how once General Mackenzie’s forces were alerted to the presence of a
large Cheyenne village, the Army and their Native American scouts waited and attacked at night.
They caught the insurgent force by surprise and watched as confusion reigned. Bourke’s account
describes brutal fighting, with Shoshone scouts scalping Cheyenne warriors during hand-to-hand
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fighting.24 General Mackenzie ordered the village to be burned after the Cheyenne had been beaten.
The Army destroyed the vital food stores and seized a substantial number of horses, which had
been part of a limited transportation network for the Cheyenne. These efforts denied movement
for the insurgency and eliminated the ability to resupply, evade, move, and fight; thus, the
insurgents were not able to retreat in sizeable numbers on horseback. The Army learned that, to
reduce the enemy’s movement, Indian Scouts were needed to discover the mobile village network
used for trading, recruiting local aid, food resupply, and the acquisition of horses. As Cheyenne
insurgent groups were killed or captured, Cheyenne civilians were moved to reservations, which
prevented the reorganization and recruitment by insurgent bands.
In another account by Bourke, he wrote about his experiences in the 1883 spring
counterinsurgency campaign against the Chiracahua Apache in the Sierra Madre. During this
campaign, the U.S. Army used similar tactics to the Wyoming winter campaign by employing
local Apache scouts with U.S. Army calvary and infantry coordination and a continual supply line.
This campaign became uniquely complex because the Chiracahua Apache retreated into Mexico
and crossed international borders to raid American towns and Mexican villages. Their main
operations were in Mexico, where they captured, enslaved, and sold Mexicans.25 The Chiracahua
Apache insurgent network established a base of operations on a tall plateau for a fortress of sorts,
which was used to raid from and retreat to. During this campaign the U.S. Army learned about the
need for coordination with international allies, which opened international partnerships with
Mexican militias and military units and allowed for troop multiplication and conservation of U.S.
troop strength and resources. This international partnership in counterinsurgency operations
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further allowed for the sharing of vital information, easier resupply, and more nodes of observation
to track the Chiracahua Apache. The coordination of allied forces helped to confine the Chiracahua
Apache on their plateau fortress, where thirst and hunger forced their surrender. These lessons of
what I term, “annihilation tactics,” were effective in ending the Indian Wars, developing
experience for the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency operations. These lessons were later carried
into the Philippines counterinsurgency efforts by U.S. officers who served in both Cheyenne and
Apache campaigns. The counterinsurgency lessons of the Indian Wars would be carried on into
the Asian theater.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, America soon picked a war with the aging Spanish
empire, because Spain held key naval ports in her colonial territories. War with Spain was
presented to the American public as a bid to stop the brutal Spanish counterinsurgency in Cuba.
For Spain was fighting a brutal counterinsurgency against a three-year Cuban uprising, which
caused the American public to call for a military intervention into Cuba to aid the Cuban
resistance.26 The USS Maine was sent to observe Spanish operations and experienced a mysterious
sinking on Feb 15, 1898 in Havana, Cuba.27 American newspapers blamed Spain and reported
news stories of a mine sinking the ship. The Spanish-American war became a unifying American
international adventure, which furthered the goal of the U.S. founders for the country to become
an official global empire. A quick conventional victory for the U.S. led to the American acquisition
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of Spain’s overseas colonies. In the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the U.S. bought the Philippines for twenty
million dollars and seized Puerto Rico and Guam, and Cuba became an American protectorate.28
A new chapter began in U.S. military history, as the U.S. military was tasked with
managing small wars of pacification in far-away territories. These pacification campaigns aimed
to defeat local indigenous insurgencies and were initially the responsibility of the U.S. Army, who
in turn produced joint operations with the U.S. Navy and the USMC. These global
counterinsurgency operations grew, first in a bid to control the Philippines and later various Latin
American nations as well. A need arose to generate a U.S. collection of learned and proven
doctrines in counterinsurgency, as custom and officers’ memories of past Native American
campaigns became insufficient. The bureaucratizing of strategies and tactics regarding U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine was at hand and would grow.
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Chapter 2
Fifteen Years of War in the Philippines: Annihilation

“Work of this kind has its disagreeable side, which is the unavoidable killing of women
and children; but it must be done, and disagreeable as it is, there is no way of avoiding it.”29
Major General Leonard Wood, 1906, Moroland Campaign

With the dawning of the twentieth century, the U.S. public was not waning from its
intensely expansionist goals for its own economic gain. The nation had claimed and pacified the
West, acquired Alaska and Hawaii, and began a serious expansion of its navy. Industry in the
American West had produced many growing economic ties to Asia, especially Chinese markets.30
The need for islands and ports to resupply American ships and naval vessels on their routes to Asia
became a crucial concern for American political leadership. Holding many of these key islands
and ports was an aging Spanish imperial power, which was growing weaker due to internal
economic chaos, political disputes, and revolts across its territories.31
U.S. imperialists of the day observed this weakening in the Spanish empire and hoped to
use it to America’s advantage. The U.S. wanted tighter control over its Latin American neighbors;
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to this end, it became involved in what became later categorized as the Banana Wars. In 1896, the
U.S. was led by President William McKinley, who had an assistant Secretary of the Navy named
Theodore Roosevelt, who would eventually become President. Two American goals now arose:
The first was to attain strong naval ports for access and control of sea lanes, and the second was to
maintain tight control of South American nations using a rigid interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine. Theodore Roosevelt was deeply influenced by the renowned naval book The Influence
of Sea Power upon History by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan argued that the oceans of the world
were large highways and whoever dominated these sea lanes of trade would control the world
markets or in essence the world.32 Making America the naval guarantor of these sea lanes became
paramount to Roosevelt, who desired the U.S. to replace the aging British empire on the sea.
For Roosevelt, all that was needed was a reason to obtain these key Spanish islands with
their naval ports. A rallying cry for war with Spain arose due to the intensely brutal
counterinsurgency operations that the Spanish army was conducting in Cuba. Under the Spanish
Governor Valeriano Weyler, the reconcentrado, or reconcentration, was occurring before
American shores.33 The Spanish strategy was to force the Cuban population into concentration
camps, creating a break of civilian support for the Cuban insurgents.34 This concentration
campaign was heavily reported in the American press, with news stories circulated about
Americans living in Cuba being assaulted by the Spanish reconcentration actions. These
concentration camps were under supplied in all facets for Cuban civilians and the conditions led
to mass deaths from disease, starvation, and the brutality of mandatory relocation. American
imperialists such as William Hearst, owner of the New York Journal, printed news articles
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advocating the need for American military intervention and garnered wide American public
support.35 Hearst was able to rile up American fervor for support for war with Spain using
emotional “yellow journalism.”36 Even though the American congress was not yet willing to give
a declaration of war, the U.S. Navy sent the USS Maine to monitor Spanish actions in Cuba.
The USS Maine, however, unexpectedly exploded in the Havana Harbor in Cuba on
February 15, 1898.37 American newspapers ran stories describing a Spanish mine destroying the
Maine, with slogans of “Remember the Maine! To Hell with Spain!”38 American public opinion
would swing aggressively for war. Alongside these events in 1898, National Geographic explained
that the U.S. had to “take its rightful position among the nations of the earth... The welfare of our
nation lies largely in the development of our trade with the nations south of us and the countries
of the Far East... our policy in the future must be an aggressive one.”39 Congress granted the nation
the war it desired, although it would write into the declaration of war with Spain a ban on the
annexation of Cuba. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, saw no ban on the
American military taking other territories from Spain for the United States. He sent orders to
Admiral George Dewey:
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“Secret and confidential Order: The Squadron except Monocacy to Hong Kong. Keep full
of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, it will be your duty to see that the
Spanish squadron does not leave Asiatic coast and then offensive operations in Philippine
Islands. Keep the Olympia until further orders. Signed Roosevelt.”40
Along with this dispatch to attack the Philippines, orders to take Guam and Puerto Rico followed.
The war with Spain was a quick conventional one that started on April 21st, 1898 and ended with
American victory on August 13th, 1898.41 With the signing of the treaty of Paris between the U.S.
and Spain, the U.S. retained Guam, Puerto Rico, and gained a protectorate in Cuba while
purchasing the sovereignty rights to the Philippines.
With the war over, the U.S. found itself in a precarious position since it had armed and
built-up rebel forces in the Philippines to help aid American forces in overthrowing Spanish rule.
Today, there is a debate over whether the U.S. promised national independence to the Philippines
once America won the war, in an effort to gain the support of the rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo.42
None would not find it surprising if independence was promised, though it is debated. There was
nonetheless a strong belief in the Filipino’s that American forces arrived to facilitate an
independent Philippines; however, independence was not to be realized at the end of the Spanish
American War. As the American flag rose over Manila and across the Philippines at the end of the
war, a cold chill fell across former allies. At the end of the war, American forces numbered roughly
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14,000 Marines and soldiers in Manila, aided with a small capable U.S. fleet.43 Confronting these
U.S. forces were 30,000 Filipino rebel soldiers, which were a patch work of loosely connected
militias.44 A tense standoff occurred in Manila as the political realities came to light. Some
American imperialists desired to only claim Manila with its surrounding areas. Indiana Senator
Albert Beveridge argued the U.S. needed the entire archipelago, seeing it as a “self-supporting,
dividend paying fleet, permanently anchored,” which could amplify American sea access to Asian
ports. The Philippines could also be used to produce an un-tariffed sugar supply. Altogether, these
elements would strengthen the American economy through an increasing market presence in
China.45
As the realization of American direct rule became apparent, the Filipino political and
military leadership prepared for war, creating an umbrella network of militias called the Army of
Liberation. On February 4th, 1899, a confrontation occurred between American soldiers on patrol
and now Filipino insurgents.46 After nearly a six-month standoff, an American soldier shot a
Filipino insurgent who did not obey his order to stop, which was due in most likelihood to a
misunderstanding in language. This event officially began the insurgent war in the northern islands
of the Philippines, which raged from 1899 to 1902.47
At first, American troops fought in their element as Aguinaldo waged a conventional war
with the Filipino Army of Liberation. After substantial causalities were sustained on the Filipino
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side without costing the American forces any significant losses, he abandoned the use of
conventional tactics. Aguinaldo dispersed his forces, command staff, and military resources across
the northern islands of Luzon and Mindoro. He established an elusive shadow government that
survived on the use of intimidation, terrorism, and forced indigenous taxation. This dispersion
caused great difficulty for the U.S. military in their attempt to defeat the insurgents because of the
geography. The Philippines is an archipelago with thousands of islands, some which are swimming
distance apart and other islands miles apart.48 Geography was craftly used to aid in the strategy of
evasion for the Army of Liberation to continue fighting. Emilio communicated broad strategies to
these independent cells, and even he did not know where they were. This approach permitted each
cell to be separate and operate safely even if one cell was found and dismantled; however, this
strategy was counterproductive for Aguinaldo because it made controlling the insurgents nearly
impossible and restricted the pooling of forces for large engagements, even when it could have
been advantageous.
During 1899 and 1900, Aguinaldo did not attempt a decisive victory against the U.S.
forces, which he understood this to be impossible; instead, he hoped to influence the American
public before the 1900 presidential election. President McKinley, a Republican, was up for
reelection with his Vice President Theodore Roosevelt. The Democrat party put up William
Jennings Bryan, who wanted to quickly let the Philippines become an independent country. The
Democrat party platform that year framed the insurgent war as an American war of “criminal
aggression, born of greedy commercialism.”49 They argued that “no nation can long endure half
republic and half empire. Imperialism abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at
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home.”50 The Filipino insurgent forces envisioned that by increasing their attacks on Americans
would drain resources and American lives, and the American voter would turn against those
supporting the war effort. This result did not occur, because in 1900, President McKinley was
reelected with a 52.5% voter support and 292 electoral votes, a slight increase over his first election
in 1896.51 Crucially he was given even more Republican seats in congress, which indicated a public
nod of support for the imperialists. The U.S. military could now escalate their fight to break the
Filipino insurgency.
To defeat such a foe, the U.S. turned to the same tactics as the Spanish Empire and the
Indian Wars. The Americans used the Spanish torture method known as the “water cure,” a form
of water boarding where the victim is forced to consume massive quantities of water before intense
pressure is put on the stomach, forcing the victim to vomit.52 This process was repeated as needed
until the intelligence was gained. The tactic of using concentration camps began with the American
military relocating many towns to “safe zones,” then proceeding to kill anyone found outside of
these safe zones.53 U.S. forces created in essence “free fire zones,” done in the aim of cutting off
the insurgents from the civilian population’s support networks of food, money, and recruits.
Captured insurgents were killed, and if a town was found to aid them, then it was burnt in its
entirety. This scorched-earth policy would cut a deep scar through the northern and eventually the
southern Philippines.
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With civilian relocation to concentration camps, the U.S. military burned all the vacated
villages or towns. The destruction of crops and poisoning of water wells were used to create a
devastating famine outside of the concentration camps, thereby compelling civilians to evacuate
the affected area and place themselves inside the camps. These camps were drastically under
supplied, which showed the abysmal ability of the American military to feed, house, keep clean,
and prevent disease. Death totals are debated, but some “estimated that 200,000 Filipinos died in
the Philippine-American War. With an estimated 4,000 Americans losing their lives in fighting,
which involved atrocities on both sides.” Ultimately, the total deaths from 1899 to 1902 are
impossible to calculate.54
Formerly persecuted religious minorities in the Philippines would prove the insurgency’s
death nail. These Filipino communities became crucial informers regarding the inner workings of
the village dynamics and opened a view into the workings of the Filipino shadow government
created by the Liberation Army in many towns and cities. These areas had not been affected by
the scorched earth policy. These Filipinos acted in like the Native American scouts; they provided
critical insight into the invisible inner workings of the insurgency. Once a spy ring was established
of Filipinos willing to work for the U.S. forces, American agents found local shadow governments
and arrested anyone associated with them. Those arrested were tortured and further divulged other
insurgents and hide outs. All insurgents were to be killed, and the hide outs destroyed. After these
events, the shadow government and military of the Liberation Army crumbled. Emilio Aguinaldo
surrendered in 1902 and joined the American government, where he worked to establish a Filipino
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government inside the American-led administration of the Philippines, and he lived on to witness
the Philippines become an independent nation after World War II.
As the war in the north of the country ended, the southern island chains began a longer and
more brutal insurgency. The Philippine Islands were not a united nation or even affected by the
call for northern Filipino nationalism. Filipino was viewed as a northern island chain term, while
many of the southern islands and tribes of the Philippines saw themselves as their own entities,
loosely knit by family or religious relations. The terms “Philippines” and “Filipino” were
impressed upon the island chain by Westerners. The northern islands, controlled and influenced
by Manila, were largely Catholic, had an educated class, and were growing in commercial
connections to Asian markets. Emilio Aguinaldo and his Liberation Army based their republican
struggle on the original American founding fathers’ republican structure. The Liberation Army
wanted an elitist group as the voting bloc, which held all political power and mostly adhered to the
class dynamics established by the Spanish. They envisioned a structure of higher class, educated
landowners, and merchants ruling the government, with a lower class of laborers uninvolved in
political decisions. Aguinaldo rejected the idea of universal Filipino suffrage, which was
ultimately detrimental to his cause because it alienated many Filipinos.
The American military and political leadership brought an entirely new political, cultural,
and legal system to the Philippines, which began an economic restructuring aimed at producing a
micro-United States. Developing the Philippines in the U.S.’s image was overwhelmingly
unpopular with the Filipino educated elites but won over many in the labor class, and most
importantly, formerly oppressed minorities. These events came coincided with an American public
supporting U.S. economic expansion into Asia, generating a stable voting block for a D.C. political
coalition to hold. This desire of the American public for expansionism and D.C. political stability
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in the Republican party broke the feasibility and strategy of The Liberation Army long-term. This
was tied to the ability of the U.S. Navy to increasingly patrol the water ways between the islands
to further isolate the insurgency. The U.S. Navy prevented insurgent forces from uniting for attacks
and coordinating resources and fighters, which drained insurgent morale.
After the surrender of the Liberation Army in 1902, President Roosevelt announced the
end of the war in the Philippines.55 Unknown to Roosevelt, the end of the northern conflict began
a second and a longer insurgency in the southern island chains. These southern islands were of
near complete Islamic following living under a mixture of indigenous culture and Islamic Sharia
law. After the U.S. centralized power in Manila and pacified the north, they turned to enforcing
American law across the entire archipelago and endeavored to embed American values of
democratic-republicanism, individualism, culture, legal structuring, and commercialism in all
areas of the Philippines. This approach proved difficult for the northern Catholic islands, which
were integrated into the global economy. The question arose regarding how to implement
American values in an extremely isolated island chain that was home to a war-prone population of
Islamic fundamentalists and linguistically diverse peoples, who derived a substantial portion of
their economy based on piracy and the slave trade. For the U.S. military this would prove an
extremely challenging counterinsurgency task for the next eleven years.
From 1902 to 1913, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps fought an especially bloody
counterinsurgency and employed all the tactics of annihilation to disrupt the insurgent networks.
The U.S. created a large constable unit of Catholic Filipinos from the northern islands that
dramatically increased the American fighting strength in the southern islands. An all-American
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force formed the backbone and was supplemented with a sizable portion of Filipinos, which
together endeavored to establish American law in the southern islands. The southern islanders
rejected American sovereignty over the south, where the most significant issue regarded the ending
of slavery. Slavery was deeply engrained into the diverse islander communities’ economy and
culture. Of the diverse southern communities, the longest resistance was from the Moros.
American political leaders in the Philippines had tolerated the practice of slavery under the
1899 Kiram-Bates treaty while they had been occupied in the north; however, the Americanization
of the southern regions did not allow for such practices to continue.56 The American goal was to
make the Philippines an industrialized colony, which included building roadways and rail lines
into the southern regions. This connection of the southern islands to the north rapidly altered the
cultural, economic, and ecological makeup of the south, which produced the rapid movement of
people and goods with the goal to build a growing Filipino market that desired American products.
The campaign used Filipino settlements as a weapon, and constable Filipinos were given
substantial portions of land, including any northern Catholic Filipino willing to relocate to the
south.57 These settlement actions angered local Moros and other Islamic tribes; as a result, many
southerners joined insurgent movements to repulse this invasion of their homeland.
This situation produced a new American counterinsurgency operation in the south, which
lasted long past 1902; however, American causalities were relatively light. This fact allowed
American public opinion to largely forget about the conflict post 1902, which worked in D.C.’s
favor. From 1903 to 1913, only 107 American service members, and 111 Filipino constables
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died.58 Americans forces injured in the campaigns were 1,706 and an unrecorded number of
Filipinos.59 The American goal was to hand over the governing of the southern region to the
Filipino populace, which was possible only through a scorched-earth removal of hostile forces and
insurgent supporting populations. Army General Leonard Wood was tasked with the southern
operations, who stated openly his view of the U.S. campaign in the Moroland:
“The people of this valley have been so hostile and intractable for generations that I have
decided to go thoroughly over the whole valley, destroying all warlike supplies, and
dispersing and destroying every hostile force, and to destroy every “Cota” [a fortified
village] where there is the slightest resistance. While these measures may appear harsh, it
is the kindest thing to do.”60
Filipino settlers were a constant aid in fighting and observing insurgent network activities, and
they relayed key information to the Filipino constables and American military units. By 1913, the
southern insurgent conflicts had ended, which brought relative peace across the American territory
of the Philippines. Americanization, industrialization, and Filipino migration into the southern
islands increased, promoting a growing unified call of nationalism which could not be denied. On
July 4th, 1946, the Philippines gained its independence.61
The American military was engaged in combat operations in the Philippines from 1898 to
1913, finally ending the Spanish-American War’s consequences.62 For fifteen years, American
political and military leaders managed an ever-shifting conflict zone in the island archipelago.
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American public support had held firm for the Republican party for the conflict’s duration. U.S.
military actions broke resistant southern cultures, organized economic integration of the
Philippines, and brought the colony further into the American and global economy, which
strengthened American political and military leaders in Manila. The northern Filipinos were
allowed a role in assuming government positions and aligned themselves with the American
mission to transform the southern islands. The U.S. carefully channeled a Filipino nationalist ideal
after 1902, which helped to stifle insurgent claims in the north and aided in crushing the southern
insurgency. Ultimately, the U.S. military was thus able to achieve victory in a fifteen-year
insurgent war in an Asian nation.
The United States Marine Corps shortly after these experiences produced a classified Small
Wars Manual, which was first published in 1921 and represented an analysis of the USMC’s
conflicts in Latin America and its operations in the Philippines. Small Wars outlined the pitfalls in
future conflicts in the later 20th-century world. With the global proliferation of firearms, increases
in the speed of transportation, and communication advancement, the U.S. victory in the Philippines
and to a mixed degree in Latin America could not be assumed going forward. The manual states:
“with all the practical advantages we enjoyed in those wars, that experience must not lead
to an underestimate of modern irregulars, supplied with modern arms and equipment. If
Marines have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the past, they must
now prepare themselves for the increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory
in the future. The future opponent may be well armed as they are; he will be able to
concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and place he
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chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the
inhabitants.”63
These concerns became glaringly real with the production of the AK-47, which turned any
insurgent into a light machine gunner. This development meant future campaigns of
counterinsurgency required more time to complete, included higher casualties, and increased the
difficultly to end successfully. Accomplishing such prolonged and deadly counterinsurgency
operations into the future, however, would require the careful winning over of the American
public’s will even more and generating an ever-stable political consensus in Washington.
The U.S. military learned key lessons from the Philippines, including a need to construct
local allied forces to act as intermediaries; to direct the host nation’s public consensus on politics
through strong political leadership in conjunction with U.S. leadership; and ample time. The U.S.
military also learned it was possible to hide an insurgent conflict with light American casualties
from the American public, which was made feasible by using the local/host nation forces to
supplement a light American troop presence. A complicating factor was that technological
advantages going forward would be mixed, as the proliferation of technology made insurgencies
worldwide evermore coordinated, deadly, and capable. These lessons and realizations would be
difficult for Washington D.C. and the U.S. military to digest, and past successes in U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics of annihilation would be difficult to maintain into future
conflicts with the American public.
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Chapter 3
American Quagmire: Heavy Boot Print

“To defeat an insurgency, you have to know who the insurgents are - and to find that out,
you have to win and keep the support of the people.”64
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife

With the end of World War II, the U.S. government and especially its military felt growing
international responsibilities. The National Security Council Paper 68 began formulating a process
of America upholding global stability, which generated the Truman Doctrine.65 The Truman
Doctrine aimed to support and defend U.S. allied nations against perceived communist subversion
and expansion into these allies, specifically to prevent regime changes. The American public
viewed themselves as champions of liberty, which enabled the enactment of long overdue civil
rights reform to some degree. No longer would the American generations post-World War II want
to see the U.S. as an empire, because in their eyes, imperial ambition among nations was to blame
for both catastrophic world wars. Direct imperial rule thus became taboo by the 1960s, which
prompted the U.S. to rebrand its external activity. The reinvention of terms and redevelopment of
doctrines redefined the U.S. was and its global responsibilities. A new generation of young
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Americans would soon grapple with how to deal with the nation’s international image,
responsibilities, and the U.S. military’s behavior in America’s counterinsurgency. A stark collision
of ideas, doctrines, and different American generations would soon cause debate regarding the
new direction of the U.S., which culminated around a nation called Vietnam.
The conflict in Vietnam was centered on late-French colonial rule in Indochina. After
France’s humiliating defeat in World War II, France sought to reassert itself in the world and hoped
to hold its crumbling imperium in Indochina. Asian peoples were not blind to the events of an
Asian imperial power, Japan, defeating the Western empires in World War II. Vietnam
experienced the short-term self-government rule of the Viet Minh, with their political leader
Nguyen Sinh Cung, commonly known Ho Chi Minh.66 As the French consolidated power in
Indochina post World War II, which forced the Viet Minh back into the mountains of Vietnam to
again play a role as a shadow government and an insurgency.
The U.S., once a nominal ally of the Viet Minh during WW II, had helped train and equip
the Viet Minh through the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).67 The OSS gave crucial medical
treatment to Ho Chi Minh, saving his life and boosting the Viet Minh insurgency against Japanese
rule in Vietnam. Post-WWII and enthralled in the Cold War, the U.S. gave support to their
demoralized French ally, who was chaffing in their newfound role as a lesser power in the world.
Bruised French pride led them to commit tremendous resources, military equipment, and over
175,000 troops deployed to hold Indochina.68 President Harry Truman assumed the responsibility
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of being the financial backer of Western-allied regimes that resisted communist insurgencies.
Beginning with the support for Greece’s monarchy against communist insurgents, the U.S. began
a dire trend of aiding allies, dictators, and non-democratic government coups against any deemed
communists.69 The French successfully sold the idea to President Truman that France was fighting
an international communist conspiracy in Indochina. The Viet Minh were not viewed as an
independence movement fighting against French imperialism. The Truman administration began
to fund the French war effort in Indochina with increasing capital. America watched over six
presidencies, a growing commitment in funds, military equipment, and American lives to the
evolving Vietnam conflict.
In the 1950s, the American public was in the grip of McCarthyism and the Red Scare and
felt powerless against communism in many ways. Public demand grew for a new, aggressive way
to resist the growing power of the Soviet Union and its international communist conspiracies.70
Americans believed that an international communist monolith was directed from Russia, and thus
resisting and fighting communism grew in its political popularity. This public belief gave political
incentive to begin dangerously escalating militarized interventions. Starting with President Dwight
Eisenhower, the U.S. began to establish a growing military presence of CIA-backed “military
advisors,” based around the newly established Green Berets, deployed to the Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam).71 The American goal was to help the newly established country of South
Vietnam resist communist infiltration and aggression; meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of
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Vietnam’s (North Vietnam) political leadership was worked to reorganize and mobilize their
nation for the mission of fully reuniting Vietnam.
In 1954, a flagrantly rigged election in South Vietnam brought Prime Minister Ngo Dinh
Diem to permanent power, and later, as President Diem, would fill his political cabinet with corrupt
allies and friends.72 Due to the derailed vote for national reunification, South Vietnam faced
internal emergencies ranging from ethnic and religious strife to the friction of urban and rural
Vietnamese animosity, which fueled Viet Cong insurgent efforts in South Vietnam. In his book
The First Domino, James Arnold described that the South Vietnamese government experienced
the increasing strength and effectiveness of the National Liberation Front. Arnold “distinguished
it from the Viet Minh: a contraction of Viet Nam Cong-San, or Vietnamese communist, the Viet
Cong… to refer without distinction to both Southern and Northern Communists, in the belief that
the latter controlled their southern brethren.”73 The Viet Cong engaged in developing an
insurgency in the South, which was aided by an increasingly organized North Vietnamese regular
army and military aid received from the communist bloc, specifically from China.
From the middle of the 1950s, the U.S. increased its counterinsurgency presence in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in a growing secret war. America aimed to stymie the Viet Cong
and the international communist agenda in Indochina due to the belief in a linkage to the Soviet
Union. Holding the line here in these countries prevented other nations from falling under Soviet
influence. Relying on the domino theory, President Eisenhower stated openly, “you have broader
considerations, that might follow, what you call the falling domino principle, you have a row of
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dominoes set up and you knock over the first one and what will happen to the last one is certainly
that it will go over very quickly.”74 Losing Vietnam represented one such domino. President
Eisenhower reasoned that stopping communism in Asia became fundamental to prevent the U.S.
from becoming a garrison state. This belief was strengthened by the perceived notion that North
Vietnam was a controlled communist ally of Communist China and the Soviet Union. The
American public and political belief was that stopping each domino from falling prevented the
next nation from falling to communist control and ultimately impeded growing Soviet international
dominance and a looming invasion of America.
Because the domino theory was engrained into the American public, American politicians
paid close attention to it, stated openly by Senate minority leader Lyndon B. Johnson, “We have
been caught bluffing by our enemies… Today it is Indochina, tomorrow Asia may be in flames.
And the day after, the Western alliance will lie in ruins.” This quote shows the broad political
support demanding aggressive U.S. action in response to perceived international communist
aggression, which was focused on Vietnam at the time.75 The Green Berets and the CIA became
united in organizing plans to prevent a collapse of the South Vietnamese government due to the
Viet Cong insurgency.
Through the Green Berets, the U.S. armed, trained, and led militias of indigenous tribes in
Laos and Vietnam’s jungles and highlands. These forces would be backed up with tremendous
amounts of air support in battling against Viet Cong supply routes, staging zones, and training
camps. The Green Berets aimed to create a “force multiplier” effect in Indochina by seeking to use
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local forces to hamper Viet Cong actions instead of a conventional American force intervention.
Developing fighters from the ostracized tribes were also a key intelligence source, acting as an
early warning system for learning about Viet Cong troop movements into the South.
Building on these Eisenhower administration efforts, President John F. Kennedy
established a Special Forces Command in 1961, leading to a new military organization called the
Special Operation Group (SOG), which was the precursor to today’s Special Operations
Command.76 This group was used for the extreme missions of deep infiltration into communistcontrolled territory in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. The SOG operated counterinsurgency
campaigns built around force multiplication from the locals and targeted the Viet Cong’s means
of organization and movement through sabotage. These campaigns were combined with an early
attempt by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to “win the hearts
and minds” of rural South Vietnamese areas.77 The goal of USAID was to establish friendly
relations with locals to help build an integrated Southern economy and to prevent or hinder the
economic draw of the Viet Cong. There was a strong belief in Modernization Theory that through
technology, economic growth, and integration into the global economy, South Vietnam would
remain a Western-liberalizing ally. Each American program was a strategy to gain local sight to
see the insurgents. These campaigns of defense, organization, and winning the hearts and minds
were spearheaded by the CIA. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, there was an estimated
seven hundred military advisors in South Vietnam.78
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The U.S. enjoyed a moderate level of success by the end of the 1950s against the Viet
Cong, but this was undermined by the tyrannical, unpopular, and urban-centered government of
Diem. In Diem’s “denounce the communists” campaign, a series of mass incarcerations, show
trials, and summary executions took place, which largely effected rural zones.79 Southern police
organizations from the city polls alienated the rural populous through corruption in these
proceedings. Rural hatred continued to grow from the 1962 Strategic Hamlet Program, which
sought to concentrate rural Vietnamese into fortified zones to be policed, defended, centralized,
and controlled in these small hamlets.80 These efforts failed as local chiefs inside the hamlets
reported to American media reporters that more troops were needed to make the people secure.81
The Viet Cong entered the hamlets at night to tax, recruit, intimidate, plan operations, and kill Viet
Cong dissenters. The hamlets became the opposite of their intended design. Green Beret units lived
in some rural villages, creating small outposts to help curtail the problem of the Viet Cong night
operations. However, the attempted cooperation with the South Vietnamese militias never came
to a point of stopping the Viet Cong rural operations and intimidation tactics.
The American counterinsurgency failure resulted from not understanding that the war was
largely a civil war. Many families in these rural zones had relatives in the Viet Cong. The rural
areas of Vietnam were a fluid zone of family relations with the “enemy,” which the Viet Cong
exploited, and they frustrated the actions of the Green Berets. The rural Vietnamese viewed the
urban South Vietnamese government as foreign, corrupt, and lacked respect or relationship with
the rural populations. Family divides as well as rural and urban divides, created a compounding
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complexity to an already dubious insurgent war. Green Berets complained about South Vietnamese
rural forces giving off “accidental” shots, or loud coughs and strange sounds while on patrol, in
most likelihood, to warn the nearby Viet Cong.82 Agreements were arranged between some rural
zones and the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong understood the need for friendly relations with the rural
populace or at least for keeping their relationship intact through intimidation, bribery, and other
means.
In 1961, President Kennedy found himself through the media to be embarrassed and bullied
by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev.83 Kennedy had the failure of the Bay of Pigs on his hands
and dealt with the chaos of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He wanted a “win” against the communist
world; thus, Vietnam became his possible source of redemption. He expanded the Green Beret and
military advisor presence to over 16,000 by the time of his death in 1963.84 This advisor increase
was tied closely with sending helicopters and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). These vehicles
were central to the new, aggressive counterinsurgency tactics against the Viet Cong. Kennedy
expressed in a speech the new communist form of insurgency: “This is another type of warfare,
new in its intensity, ancient in its origin. War by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war
by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression.”85 He broke from the past
WWII mindset of large conventional warfare to a small, aggressive, mechanized force led by the
Green Berets and using air power and host nation forces.
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This secret war of the Green Berets was not supposed to be American led, or so the
American public was told. This had been a lie from the beginning since American forces had been
deeply embedded into indigenous militias, village defense, raiding the Viet Cong, and leading the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops in battle.86 By 1962, the American military’s
mission began the failed process of Americanization of the Vietnam war, led by the expanding
control of the newly established Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).87 MACV
centralized pentagon control and pulled the direction of the war away from the CIA. The CIA had
previously focused on the rural areas of South Vietnam, where the enemy was actively recruiting
and organizing forces. Up to 1962, success was occurring for the American’s and South
Vietnamese, and this worried the North Vietnamese and Chinese. China supplied the Viet Cong
and the North Vietnamese government efforts, and this aid from the wider Communist world
shifted the American political and military leadership away from the successful CIA/Green Beretled counterinsurgency efforts. After the death of President Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon B.
Johnson (LBJ) assumed the presidency and role of leading the Vietnam War effort. Retaining the
former members of Kennedy’s cabinet, new pressure arose from these men and MACV officers to
place conventional forces in Vietnam. The war-weary LBJ listened, and more conventional troops
swiftly became the answer to the growing conventional campaign failures, leaving the CIA/Green
Beret-led counterinsurgency campaign behind in favor of an American conventional war in
Vietnam.
There are multiple ways to win counterinsurgency campaigns, although each route requires
various levels of lives lost, materials, and political commitment to win. The change to conventional
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war, however, arose due to the past successes of conventional forces in WWII and Korea along
with the D.C. political desire to look anticommunist to the American public, which desired strong
anticommunist actions. These changes overlooked the required American blood that these new
conventional strategies would require. The administration ignored the successes in the Green Beret
and CIA’s secretly run counterinsurgency, which occurred in the rural communities. This LBJ
change to a visible, conventional war with large troop formation battles became an anti-communist
show for the American public. Conventional war doctrines harkened back to the tactics of the
Philippines and Western campaigns of the late nineteenth century. This counterinsurgency
doctrinal shift would prove to be intolerable to an ever-growing section of America.
The changes that occurred in the 1960s American public mindset contrasted with the
American generations that sanctioned the Philippine and American Indian War campaigns. Racism
and dehumanization had played a vital role in direct rule imperialism, viewing colonialized people
as savages or, at best, as children. The American Civil Rights Movement played a leading role in
dramatically changing the young American public opinion, especially post WWII. The American
public experienced a growing inability to separate emotions for American war efforts and for
Vietnamese victimized by the war effort. Past wars of American imperialism included American
antiwar and anti-imperialist organizations that were vocal but fell on deaf public ears, but this was
changing as a resurgence of anti-imperialist writings grew. One source of antiwar rhetoric that
became popular at the time was from retired Major General Smedley Butler, a two-time Medal of
Honor recipient. He gave a renowned speech, War is a Racket, outlining war’s profiteering of
American imperialism:
“Until 1898 we didn’t own a bit of territory outside the mainland of North America… Then
we became internationally minded. We forgot, or shunned aside, the advice of the Father
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of our country…We went to war. We acquired outside territory…It would have been far
cheaper (not to say safer) for the average American…to stay out of foreign entanglements.
For a few, this racket, like bootlegging and other underworld rackets, brings fancy profits,
but the cost of operations is always transferred to the people - who do not profit.”88
American antiwar and anti-imperialist groups initially received limited political or public backing;
however, by the 1960s and the arrival of the draft, these past works and ideas became more publicly
mainstream, which became American political power.
Prior to WWII, the American public had been embedded with White Nationalism, which
included racism and dehumanization needed for conducting imperial counterinsurgency efforts of
annihilation, which gave the American public the ability to tolerate the brutal tactics used against
dehumanized indigenous peoples. In campaigns of brutality, the use of concentration camps,
torture, starvation and thirst as weapons, and mass killing on non-white groups were tolerated by
the American public. By the 1960s, this tolerance changed, and the required racism and
dehumanization needed for direct rule imperialism were viewed as similar to Nazi Fascism and
became untenable in the post-WWII period. The doctrines that D.C. and MACV chose to win the
Vietnam War failed, in part because leaders did not appreciate the nature of the change that the
American public had undergone to reject anything similar to direct rule imperialism
counterinsurgency doctrine operations.
After the confusing or nefarious 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident involving North
Vietnamese’s naval vessels attacking American naval vessels and a false radar reading of a second
attack soon after. President Johnson decided on a massive conventional troop increase and received
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congressional authorization for a dramatic uptick in military operations in the Vietnam conflict.89
Congress gave the President the authorization to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam
and permitted bombing of North Vietnam. A bombing campaign of gradual pressure began called
Operation Rolling Thunder.90 This air operation was an increasing number of bombing attacks on
industrial zones, military bases, troop formations, and any materials deemed useful for the Viet
Cong’s war effort in the South.91 These large-scale bombing operations in the North also produced
massive civilian deaths.
The conventional American infantry units moving into the Vietnam conflict were largely
young inexperienced men, who were often drafted for the war and used tactics of food starvation
and village destruction.92 U.S. Army and Marine units were sent to burn the food supplies of rural
villages that were deemed to be aiding the communist insurgency, which included orders to burn
so-called hooches in villages that were deemed aiding the Viet Cong. News reporters followed the
progress of U.S. conventional forces’ actions, and Americans at home watched the war’s news and
developments every day on television. Along with mounting scenes of brutality, they saw
Americans burning rural Vietnamese villages, U.S. air power causing mass destruction, and the
conventional war contributing to civilian deaths in the North.
Alongside these events, some of the war’s most heinous accounts came from the American
unit code named Tiger Force of the 101st airborne.93 Tiger Force was a reconnaissance unit that
was sent into the deep jungles of Vietnam to beat the Viet Cong at their own insurgent game. Some
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former soldiers of Tiger Force gave accounts of rape, mass murder, mutilation, and
dismemberment of Vietnamese villagers, and the use of torture.94 The American public and media
dew draw a direct connection to Nazi Storm trooper actions. Was not America better than this?
These actions were deemed actions of an empire, though America was not an empire. Or was it?
Empire was now unacceptable, and the war tactics of direct imperial action were being rejected by
the American public.
American troops continued to increase in number in Vietnam and led the war, being termed
as an Americanization of the Vietnam war.95 Which now saw U.S. servicemembers lead, direct,
and die for the Vietnamese war effort. This demand for troops would require a growing number of
Americans to be drafted into the war, which was a key friction point in the relations with the
Vietnamese people. Young drafted American troops did not have the same training in the language,
patience, or goals of the Green Berets, who worked to build relationships with locals, gaining
insight into local communities and intelligence for American forces to see the insurgents.
American conventional forces were quickly trained to fight and kill an enemy, and the troops
arriving in Vietnam could not recognize the difference between the enemy and the local people,
which shaped the common feeling that all Vietnamese were the enemy. In addition, using the draft
interrupted many young Americans’ lives, thereby distressing families with the possibility of their
sons dying in a far-off war zone. The draft meant removing men from college using a rank structure
at universities, and it increased racial tensions as more minorities were being drafted compared to
the white population.96 President Johnson knew these failures were coming to a head, and he was
conflicted, speaking the quiet part out loud, he said: “We don’t have a prayer of staying in Vietnam.
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These people hate us, but I can’t give up a piece of territory like that to the Communists and then
get the people to reelect me.”97 The President understood that American actions were alienating
the Vietnamese populace, but that still enough American public and political party winds called
for war. These events fueled the anti-war movement and alienated a growing portion of the
American public against the Vietnam War; however, until 1968, did the American public’s will
turn generally anti-war, in the aftermath of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive.
The released classified documents of the Pentagon Papers exposed the internal controversy
about the failing conventional strategy. In a 1965 memo created by Assistant Sectary of Defense
John McNaughton to then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, McNaughton noted that: “The
situation in general is bad and deteriorating. The VC [Viet Cong] have the initiative. Defeatism is
gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities, and even among the soldiers especially those with relatives in rural areas.”98 Seeing the current strategies as failing,
McNaughton explained that: “U.S. aims were the following: 70% to avoid a humiliating US defeat,
20% to keep SVN [South Vietnam] territory from Chinese hands, and 10% to permit the people of
SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.”99 The aim was to keep U.S. prestige intact rather than
finding a successful conclusion to the war, which highlights the public’s and political incentive
creating U.S. military doctrine for the war. The top leaders of the Pentagon were not drawing from
the Vietnam battlefield to fix the failing counterinsurgency doctrine but public perception.
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The Americanization of the Vietnam War was akin to a strategy of swinging a
sledgehammer in the dark hoping to hit an elusive target, and it caused a mounting level of
destruction on civilians. This development was entwined with a continued effort to defeat the
insurgency by using brutal tactics seen in rural Vietnamese village annihilation, including
starvation, torture on suspected Viet Cong members, and mass population movement into hamlets,
which was further complicated by America’s ties to a corrupt and fractured political system as an
ally in the South. These failings would not be tolerated for long by the American public, and the
conflict’s variables again depreciated the timeline for such conventional strategies and tactics to
succeed. Americans had tolerated a volunteer force which used a shield of deniability around its
use of brutal tactics, unlike the drafted army and nightly news showing the war’s continuance to
the American public, which was unsustainable. For the eventual success of conventional tactics of
annihilation to work in Vietnam required increasing amounts of American blood, and crucially,
more time. However, more time was politically unsustainable, for an observable war runs on a
tight timeline for the American public. The author Phillip Davidson explains in his book Vietnam
At War, this American time restraint in war. Quoting a senior intelligence officer on his view for
America’s will for war using a ratio to time, America has an “incapacity to sustain a long,
unfocused, inconclusive, and bloody war far from home, for an unidentified or ill-defined national
objectives.”100 The political structure grew ever aware of the American public’s internal clock.
Army General William Westmoreland, who was in charge of MACV, did not appreciate
this point of time and American patience. Describing to the American Congress in a joint address
in April 1967, he sought “the crossover point”, where American forces were killing more enemies
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than the Viet Cong could replace, in the drive for “body count”.101 The importance of body count
was highlighted in his exchange with visiting Senator Frits Hollings in Saigon. Westmorland
explained: “We are killing these people at a rate of ten to one.” Hollings replied: “Westy, the
American people don’t care about the ten, they care about the one.”102 The drive for a body count
created a false aim for Westmoreland and MACV, which developed an incentive for American
units to kill as many Vietnamese as could be found and inflate figures of killed enemy combatants,
breeding false statistics for decisional basis. Westmoreland’s strategy sought to produce
quantifiable diagrams of “data” that could prove to the American people that the U.S. military was
winning the war. It was often mentioned that “the light can be seen at the end of the tunnel,” but
this narrative soon backfired on President Johnson and MACV in 1968.103
The Viet Cong were not deterred by the lopsided kill ratios, their own civilian death counts,
their nation in rubble from the bombing, or their brutal tactics of pacifying the rural Southern areas
in their control.104 A final campaign was fashioned by the North called the Tet Offensive, which
involved large numbers of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars, who were stationed in the
south and were secretly stockpiling weapons and ammunition.105 A farce truce was declared for
the lunar holiday of Tet, which the North Vietnamese leadership believed was the moment for
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striking a fatal blow against the South Vietnamese and American forces, which would inspire a
mass civilian uprising of the “oppressed” South Vietnamese.
Beginning on January 31, 1968, a tidal wave of Viet Cong attacked nearly every major city
in South Vietnam.106 This military operation was a strategic abysmal failure for the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese, who incurred around 40,000 casualties including 30,000 killed.107 This North
Vietnamese military failure, however, provided the political change needed in the U.S. by
convincing the American public that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable. 1968 would be the
turning point for the American public, which led to the American political structure to seek an end
to its involvement in Vietnam. Which I pin on the turning away from a secret military
counterinsurgency effort to a conventional war, which failed from its unacceptable
counterinsurgency tactics of annihilation and human cost, which repulsed the American public;
further complicated by a wavering and corrupt South Vietnamese ally. All these events reinforced
the source of the American counterinsurgency doctrine creation employed in Vietnam as being
from a three-way American conversation, where the American public held the final say.
The difficult lesson of defeat in Vietnam revealed doctrinal misunderstandings that the U.S.
military needed to analyze deeply. They learned that there were limits to the American public’s
will, which could be affected by recent developments in media technology, rules regarding press
access, high U.S. servicemember casualties, changes in the American public’s racial
consciousness, and the political controversy of the draft. The military realized the existence of an
American public internal clock for visible wars and comprehended the change from the earlier
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successes in the counterinsurgency war. These pressures forced an evolution in U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrines thereafter into the twentieth century.
The strategy of turning attention away from the rural countryside was a devasting mistake.
Marine Lt. General Victor Krulak explained that the village was central and missed by MACV:
“the real war is amongst the people, not the highlands.”108 Westmoreland’s tactic of finding and
destroying the enemy’s large troop formations in “search and destroy” missions had not paid off.109
This failure related to the political failure of being unable to clean up the corruption of the South
Vietnamese government, which crucially alienated rural populations, who were the key support
network for the Viet Cong. This village network of support, transportation, recruitment, and
concealment enabled the Tet Offensive possible, and ultimately broke the American public’s will.
The inability to uncover the insurgent networks in rural Vietnam was the primary cause for
losing the war. This American blindness to the insurgent network contributed to the hatred and
lashing out of American troops at the Vietnamese, who were not all the enemy, and produced
elements that led to the American public’s repulsion to the war. The political structures in D.C.
thus recognized the untenability of staying in Vietnam after 1968.
The U.S. military and D.C. leadership began a soul-searching mission for understanding
the successes and failures in Vietnam, which began the next evolution in U.S. counterinsurgency
doctrine. The successes of the CIA and Green Berets working inside the rural indigenous village
framework with urban host nation’s forces, before the conventional forces of Americanization
failure, became better understood. If American troop formations could not be deployed to the
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conflict, developing the same standard of unit capabilities by the host nation’s forces became the
goal in professionalization. This strategy would keep the American public largely uninterested in
conflicts due to low American causalities and would generate more time for the U.S. military to
operate. Time was realized to be a key ingredient or military resource in American
counterinsurgency campaigns.
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Chapter 4
Loss of Control: Light Boot Print

“Once again, for the first time since the mid-1950's, a small group of American military
advisers has been placed at the outer edges of American foreign policy, charged with the task of
helping the government of a strategic country defeat a communist-led insurgency, described by
the Administration as a threat to the security of the United States.”110
Lydia Chavez, The New York Times, July 24, 1983

The U.S. military and D.C. learned a litany of stark lessons from its military experiences
in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The American public expressed that they did not want their sons
drafted to fight poorly articulated, long, foreign wars; nevertheless, the public accepted secret wars
executed by professional warriors of special forces who offered a wall of deniability, which had
been successful in the early Vietnam campaigns of the 1950s. These tactics allowed for a longer
American presence in a foreign war and occurred without significant public discussion or active
resentment. The time span of a war became understood to be a crucial element by the American
leadership. Once U.S. wars turned conventional and within public view, the length of time that the
conflict was acceptable to the American public became noticeably short.
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There were strategies to gain more time for prosecuting a counterinsurgency war, including
building walls of deniability, and using top-secret classifications that were undisclosed due to
“national security” interests. These obstacles required time to be penetrated by the American
public, who faced uncertainty in determining what was reality and what was hearsay, which
allowed for a longer timetable for military actions to take place. The late 1970s brought a new
phase in the Cold War, where deniability, secrecy, training, and arming foreign forces with
embedded U.S. Special Forces became the doctrine of choice in counterinsurgency in Latin
America. Latin America had been the site of long past American interventions, such as by
President Theodore Roosevelt’s “gunboat diplomacy” in Latin American nations. The USMC’s
Small Wars Manual was a product of the experiences of the Marine Corps occupations and
interventions in handling “banana republics” (aiming to protect American citizens’ property) or
actual national occupations such as in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere
in Latin America. By the 1970s, a new phase of American interventionism arrived.
By the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America became a vital role in American counterinsurgency
campaigns focused against Cuban trained and sponsored rebel groups. These small wars of
influence with Havana led the U.S. to form The School of the Americas in Panama in the
American-controlled corridor.111 This school was the training hub for most Latin American
officers selected for top commands in their home nations. The CIA used the school to generate
close ties or “ins” with these future military leaders, which allowed close lines of communication
and coordination for the overthrow of governments in Latin American who became too strongly
associated with communism, including for example, a Chilean officer coup which was an
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American-sponsored overthrow of a leftist government in Chile.112 In addition, American support
aided Brazilian officers in a successful coup against their country’s government.113 Similar U.S.
support flowed into El Salvador, resulting in a trinity of U.S. support in Guatemala, Nicaragua,
and El Salvador. Focusing on El Salvador, the U.S. doubled down on its portrayal of preventing
Latin America from falling to communism through the domino theory.
In this U.S. bid to stop the national dominoes from falling, alongside the officer training
programs created in Panama, the U.S. developed local-enlisted units for Latin American nations,
which were American trained, equipped, and funded.114 The successful use of U.S.-trained
indigenous troops was observed in Columbia against communist insurgents.115 Additional training
took place for other Latin American units at Fort Benning, Georgia, which was and is, the “Home
to the Infantry” and where the U.S. Army trains its infantry, airborne, and Ranger units.116 A
chronic problem Latin American nations faced was a military force with extremely poor or nonexistent training. On the insurgent side, many pro-communist rebel groups traveled to Cuba to
train, organize, and become equipped. A large portion of this military hardware supplied to them
by Cuba was the American weaponry that was left behind in Vietnam after the U.S. withdrawal.
The Eastern European Communist bloc also sent funds and resources to Havana, which were left
to Cuba to funnel, distribute, and train insurgent forces as it saw fit in Latin America.117
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El Salvador is a tiny nation in Central America which was formally established in 1524 as
an Imperial Spanish colony and for a time part of Mexico, but declared its independence in 1841.118
For over 300 years, the Spanish empire molded a rigid agrarian society run by a small elite caste
of landowners. These authoritarian oligarchs ran their plantations as tiny fiefdoms and created
local militias to police, control, and regulate their peasant-class field hands. Indigo and coffee were
the crops of choice from the 19th century onward, which spawned a boom-and-bust economy for
El Salvador with frequent, sporadic peasant revolts occurring during economic down turns. A
change occurred in the beginning of the 20th century with these sporadic revolts through the
proliferation of technology that could connect opposition groups. Due to the growing coordination
of these peasant revolts and the potential for political change, the El Salvadoran government’s
level of lethality grew against these internal insurgency conflicts.
In the 1920s, Marxist ideology begin to spread within El Salvadoran academic circles. A
man named Augustin Farabundo Marti Rodriguez embraced such Marxist ideas and zealously
preached as a revolutionary leader in the western El Salvadoran provinces. 119 With the decline of
the El Salvadoran economy during the Great Depression, many small coffee farmers and peasant
field hands were won over to this Marxist revolutionary, which began the first communist
revolution in Latin America in 1932.120 This communist insurgency erupted for a few days, who
seized towns and villages, killing local politicians, plantation owners, and landlords. This
communist revolution did not get far because the revolutionaries were poorly equipped with few
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firearms, and their militia forces were not organized to a point to fight a straight-out war with the
El Salvadoran military.
General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez was a fascist-styled strong man who had
recently seized political power in El Salvador. Martinez mobilized the military to crush the
communist insurgency and he commenced La Matanza, known in English as “The Massacre.” It
is unknown how many were killed, but it is estimated that 20,000 to 30,000 El Salvadorans were
killed in La Matanza.121 Those killed were not all communist insurgents, as some were
sympathizers of connected civilians and many just happened to live in certain zones that were in
revolt, but all were slaughtered. This historical precedence of violently purging the communist
revolution in 1932 set the stage for a near repeat of the conflict half a century later, which was
complicated, however, due to the El Salvadoran government working with the U.S. military.
El Salvador’s economy changed little by the late 1960s, because a strong oligarchy of
wealthy property owners, industrialists, and plantation owners known as La Catorce, (the fourteen
families) ran the nation, who had no desire to reform or diversify the economy.122 They endeavored
to keep a concentrated hold on political power, fearing any political change which might affect
land ownership and the political status quo. The oligarchs reinforced their coalition with
paramilitary squads of military veterans and willing thugs, nicknamed El Orden, or “The Order,”
who would intimidate, harass, beat, and kill as directed.123 This situation continued to drastically
divide the economic standing between El Salvadorans.
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In Russell Crandall’s book The Salvador Option, named after the Pentagon’s code name
for the American operation in El Salvador, he described that “the Salvadoran oligarchy considered
itself the architects of El Salvador, whose industriousness allowed them to create something out
of nothing in this tiny, overpopulated…country.”124 He quotes a wealthy Salvadoran oligarch to
explain this engrained belief, “our entrepreneurial spirit is the country’s only natural resource…
without us the country will sink into the grave.”125 With this stanch outlook and belief in their
position, the elites of the country would stop at nothing to “save” El Salvador from the idea of an
international communist agitation. The communist insurgents were coordinating and training in
Havana and obtaining American military hardware from the communist world. The oligarchs
swept under the rug the obvious need for reforms in the economy, the legal system, political
diversification, and pervasive corruption. This economic and political environment encouraged
many to view the insurgency as the only path to national reform.
A new form of Catholicism in Latin America further complicated these events. In El
Salvador’s history, the Catholic Church had been a strong ally of the oligarchy, but times were
changing by the 1960s. In this nation’s battle of ideologies entered a militant style of Catholicism
from the Jesuits, in the form of Liberation Theology.126 Who saw poverty, ignorance, and
oppression from governments, as the Church’s responsibility to dismantle. This belief was an
outgrowth of the Vatican II (1962-1965) decisions, which reformed a litany of Catholicism’s older
doctrines. Adherents to Liberation Theology were to liberate the people from these societal “sins”
in the belief that the people would then turn in mass to Christianity and salvation in Jesus Christ

124

Crandall, The Salvador Option, 48.
Ibid, 48.
126
Matt Eisenbrandt, Assassination Of A Saint: The Plot To Murder Oscar Romero and The
Quest To Bring His Killers To Justice (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 43.
125

61
once freed from these local oppressions. Once the civil war began, Liberation Theology blurred
the lines between religion and politics, which plagued El Salvador with an epidemic of paramilitary
assassinations against religious leaders and followers.
Countering the insurgencies of communism in Latin America had been a long-term
American effort. The Eisenhower administration had begun funding allied military and police
forces.127 The reason was to build core institutions in nations that brought stability from
professional police and military forces, without needing direct American intervention. U.S. policy
during President Franklin Roosevelt’s leadership broke from the Banana Wars strategy of direct
American intervention in the 19th and early 20th century to instead follow the Good Neighbor
Policy of less American interventionism.128 During the Kennedy administration, the before
mentioned Latin American U.S. military institutions and partnerships received increased funding,
a roughly fifty percent increase.129 By 1961, the U.S. established the Special Forces Group in Latin
America with the aim of aiding nations with communist rebel groups.130 Many U.S. Special Forces
veterans returning from Vietnam rotated through and trained Latin American troops how to resist
communist influences externally and how to neutralize insurgent movements internally.
During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the uptick in violence in El Salvador
in assassinations, increased steadily between right-wing fascist militias and leftist-socialist
militias. By 1977, the violence made clear a civil war was near in El Salvador, which precipitated
increased American aid to the government.131 By 1979, a tidal wave of events occurred globally
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which were not in America’s favor, which affected America’s foreign policy in Latin America.
Americans watched as an ally in Iran fell to the Iranian Islamic revolution, Americans in the Iranian
embassy were held hostage, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the Nicaraguan
government was overthrown by the communist Sandinistas with Cuban support. The Carter
administration, back peddling from global events and did not want to allow another American ally
to fall. These global events fanned a new wave of American public belief of being under siege
while seeing the domino theory coming closer to the American home front. The American public
believed that Cuba, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and now El Salvador, were examples of these
communist revolutions getting closer to America. The U.S. response was to increase funding,
military equipment, and military advisors:
“Most of the advisers in El Salvador, whose number was close to fifty-five, a number that
was set by the Defense Department in 1980…was a highly qualified group (half of them
officers, many with advanced degrees, most of them Green Berets, with an expertise in
counterinsurgency and augmented by subsequent experience in Latin America); the men
were acutely conscious of the Vietnam parallel.”132
These secret U.S. military operations established communication and surveillance abilities,
alongside Green Beret military training and mission participations, supported by American
airpower. These resources arrived in force in El Salvador by the early 1980s.
This U.S. intervention into El Salvador grew with funding and was obscured as much as
possible over three presidencies that would handle the El Salvadoran civil war. This U.S.-executed
counterinsurgency campaign learned from Vietnam’s failures, understanding that there had to be

132

Lydia Chavez, “The Odds In El Salvador.” The New York Times, July 24, 1983.

63
near zero American casualties and an extremely small gray area of troop levels. The aim to avoid
triggering the “Vietnam syndrome” in the American public, which was still weary of foreign
intervention.133 The Vietnam syndrome derived from the fear of committing large numbers of
young American service members to die in a foreign jungle for an unknown reason while aiding a
corrupt allied government. Such a controversy in enabling another failed U.S. military intervention
was political suicide for the party in power; however, it was also a political death note to “allies”
to communist insurgencies. The American public still had a substantial number that believed in
the domino theory and wanted U.S. action to stop communist subversive activities internationally,
conceiving that these activities were protecting the American homeland. This conflicting public
pressure for the homeland’s protection from communism with near zero American forces being
killed created a new type of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in El Salvador.
An exceptionably brave documentary film The Front Line, explores El Salvador in 1983
and interviews random people in El Salvador about events occurring around them. The film was
shot in both urban and rural areas and shares interviews with both Salvadoran soldiers and
communist rebels in addition to both sides’ political leaders in the effort to understand each side’s
viewpoint. The filmmakers portrayed an urban zone that experienced assassinations on a nightly
basis. Bodies were dropped randomly in the streets, which was purposely ignored by the urban
population because they feared a death squad’s retribution. The right-wing military leader Roberto
D’Aubuisson explained that his forces were fighting an international communist conspiracy and
he contended that some “patriots” were creating anti-communist groups to kill communists outside
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of the law and government control. He wanted to build a wall of deniability between the Americanfunded government, the Salvadoran military, and the nightly killings by death squads.
The film crew interviewed a Mr. Bill Murphy, an American businessman and farmer from
Texas, who shared that he had lived and worked in El Salvador for 26 years and had witnessed the
situation develop. He reported that:
“according to history we are very abusive in this country… we need a strong man, he does
not have to be a military man, but he does have to be a strong man and have the military
force behind him…Only thing Roberto D’Aubuisson is doing is fighting communism and
if we don’t wake up and help these countries fight communism, we’ve got it in our
backdoor. If you think Mexico can last, your wrong! They can’t last! Communism will take
over Mexico because Mexico by itself will fall. And then when we get them on the other
side of the Rio Grande crossing into Baron County, San Antonio, I wonder then what
people will say?”134
Mr. Murphy reiterated a widely held American public belief of an impending communist invasion
or terror threat to the American homeland. Fear of a communist subversion still ran deep in the
American voter base, which President Ronald Regan encouraged, stating that: “What we are doing
is going to the aid of an El Salvadoran government…to halt the infiltration into the Americas by
terrorists…who aren’t just aiming at El Salvador but…who are aiming at the whole of Central and
possibly later South America, and I’m sure, eventually, North America.”135
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President Reagan stoked these American fears by insinuating the monolith of communism
cohesion and Soviet influence may have sway in the insurgency, as maybe a possible wider plan
for global domination, coming out of the “evil empire.”136 This sentiment was expressed on April,
27,th 1983 in President Reagan’s speech to a joint session of Congress about El Salvador’s conflict:
“Suddenly the so-called freedom fighters in the hills were exposed for what they really are,
a small minority who want power for themselves and their backers, not democracy for the
people. I do not believe that most of the Congress of the country, is prepared to stand by
passively, while the people of Central America are delivered to totalitarianism. And we
ourselves are left vulnerable to new dangers… when the Soviets today could recognize the
Caribbean and Central America as vital to our self-interest, shouldn’t we also?”137
He alluded to possible Soviet opportunism in the close to home Central American conflicts. This
fear mongering would motivate many Americans to support the Reagan administration, which
effectively increased U.S. war efforts in El Salvador, thereby increasing military equipment,
training, and advisor numbers. These efforts had the goal to defeat the communist insurgency,
although American causalities were not to be allowed since a bloodless American
counterinsurgency operation was the goal.
This decentralized American counterinsurgency against communist insurgents was to be
played out by the El Salvadorans, who received American Huey helicopters, M16 rifles, bombs,
and communication equipment. Soldiers were to be paid by American tax dollars, trained at
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American bases, and aided by Green Beret advisors. This seemed like a top-down, Americancontrolled El Salvadoran government and military. But was it? The El Salvadoran military, which
was funded and molded in the American fashion, was supposed to execute the war by American
standards. In theory, training, equipping, and funding the El Salvadoran military would engrain
the Salvadorans with the American way of fighting and an internal ethos for operations; in practice,
this proved to be a grave misconception. The Salvadorans’ history, class structure, and political
makeup was more engrained in their own soldiers’ decision-making than the U.S. military had
anticipated.
An investigative book called The Massacre at El Mozote, by Mark Danner investigates the
nightmarish massacre in El Salvador in early December, 1981. The massacre occurred in several
towns in the northeast jungles and was perpetrated by a well-equipped and American trained unit
called the Atlacatl Battalion, which was led by Colonel Domingo Monterrosa, a top student from
the U.S. military’s School of the Americas. The Atlacatl Battalion committed mass killing, raping,
and pillaging of several towns, where men, women, and children were brutally slaughtered, with
no quarter given, with estimates near a 1,000 killed.138 The military headquarters of the El
Salvadorans reasoned that brutalizing the populations in the jungle regions would send fear
throughout the jungle, causing a mass exodus of the networks of support that the insurgents used
for recruiting fighters, supply acquisitions and insurgent information networks. The tactic of
annihilation of the civilian population harkened back to the tactics used by the American military
in the Philippines in the early 20th century; however, the American public and military doctrines
of the 1980s were radically different and rejected such activity as not acceptable.
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News outlets quickly spread the news internationally. The insurgents worked to use the
event as a recruiting tool and assisted news media crews to descend on the massacre sites. A
general international outcry grew regarding American military support and actions in the El
Salvadoran civil war. Many Americans criticized the war effort, which moved the Reagan
administration to significantly increase its political pressure on the El Salvadoran government and
military leadership. The administration worked to discredit the story and used the walls of
deniability to shield American involvement and hinder those trying to get to the massacre sites.
An understanding of the lack of American control over the war became clear as American
resources, training, and funding were being abused, which embarrassed the U.S. military and the
Reagan administration.
Despite political pressure on the El Salvadoran government and military leadership to clean
up their act and stop large-scale massacres, many smaller sized killings occurred until the end of
the civil war. From 1981 onward, the El Salvadoran army kept its extrajudicial killings to under
fifty when engaging in a village.139 Yet, El Salvador’s government did not cease its use of death
squads. Even before the massacres at El Mozote, there had been an international uproar in 1980
when Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated by a government directed death squad.140
International outcry came again with the killing of Jesuit priests and children, portrayed as
insurgent sympathizers or possible supporters, in the aftermath of the 1989 Battle of San
Salvador.141 This battle included a close city-wide seizure of the nation’s capital by the Farabundo
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Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents but was narrowly repelled by the El
Salvadoran military.
Although these atrocities were perpetrated by a U.S. ally that received American backing
in political and military aspects, the U.S. public did not turn against the war effort in large part.
No large-scale American public antiwar movement changed the political scenery. Even with
American forces dying in the El Salvadoran combat zone, it did not change the overall American
public’s mood. In 1987, an article by the Chicago Tribune shines some light on the conflict, after
an American Green Beret died:
“Sgt. Fronius was the first American to die in a combat situation in El Salvador. He was
not the first American casualty of the communist insurgency there. Another U.S. adviser
was gunned down in downtown San Salvador in 1983, and four off-duty marines were
killed at a cafe. Those too were tragedies, but they did not constitute a basis for policy
change. What the troops do, as President Reagan noted of Sgt. Fronius` death, is ''bring
home to everyone what we face'' in the way of the communist threat in Central America.”142
American casualties were of volunteers and occurred at low levels. This was not only accepted by
the American public, who in 1980 voted for Ronald Reagan with a slight 50% majority. In his
reelection in 1984, he had won over 58% of the vote, a startling American public approval jump.143
This overwhelming popularity allowed for U.S. support in El Salvador to continue
regardless of the atrocities in the civil war, which had little political effect on President Reagan.
Reagan renewed the U.S. cultural Red Scare against the “Evil Empire” of the Soviet Union. This
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belief was displayed perfectly in the blockbuster 1984 movie Red Dawn, which shows a literal
Russian invasion of the U.S., supported by invading communist allies from Central America and
Cuba.144 The movie, which remains a right-wing cult favorite today, plays on the fear in the
American public in the 1980s of being attacked by the Soviet Union and her controlled allies in
Latin America. This Hollywood concept is what Mr. Murphy in El Salvador shared and was
amplified by President Reagan.
American public support, along with its perceived fears and beliefs, allowed El Salvador
to be a continual U.S. military counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. was able to stay in El
Salvador long enough to see the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991.145 These events ended most of the funding and
weapons supply and crushed morale for communism, which had once flowed into Cuba before
being exported into El Salvador’s civil war. A United Nations peace agreement was created soon
after these events. The Chapultepec Peace Accords in Mexico were signed by the El Salvadoran
government and FMLN insurgents in January 1992.146 The war had killed roughly 75,000 El
Salvadorans, displacing nearly half a million, and destroyed significant portions of the country
physically, and deeply scarred El Salvador psychologically.147 The FLMN reorganized into a
political party, and the military obtained an amnesty clause to prevent trials into the war’s atrocities
to provide immunity and turn the national page on the conflict. Though little would be done,
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however, to restructure the economic inequality which had brought about the conflict, due to the
economy’s agricultural centralization and lack of diversification to prevent a boom and bust.
El Salvador is a small Latin American nation that was home to five million at the time and
represented the site of the largest U.S. strategic counterinsurgency “success” in the Cold War.148
The civil war illustrated that when the American people saw few U.S. military personnel casualties,
they shielded themselves from a sense of connection tied with plausible deniability to the war
effort. The American public did not see American military actions at play and had a cultural
majority against the insurgents’ international backers. A U.S. counterinsurgency could therefore
continue long enough to bring it to a conclusion. Time was again a valuable resource for winning
the counterinsurgency, giving needed time to be able to outlast the insurgents will and resources,
and restructure the host nations politics or economy that gave rise to the insurgency. El Salvador
had direct American military involvement from 1977 to 1992, representing a 15-year U.S.
counterinsurgency campaign which was waged in a foreign jungle successfully.149 American
counterinsurgency strategy had again evolved with the needed secrecy, low U.S. casualties, and
developed host nation forces to engage in counterinsurgency post-Vietnam, holding the course
with the 1980s American public will, which desired to be tough on international communism.
Though a core problem was experienced for the U.S., a loss of control by American
advisors arose throughout the 15-year “Salvador Option” counterinsurgency operation, which
would have to be remedied in the future. The lack of a sizeable, credible American troop presence,
which was strong enough to correct and control local military forces, had been missing in El
Salvador. The El Salvadoran government and military leaders knew that they had a near unending
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American commitment with no tangible way to be held liable for their actions by the Americans.
This permitted them to prosecute the war in whatever way they saw fit, perpetually using death
squads and massacres, even if toned down after the El Mozote massacre.
In future counterinsurgency campaigns, the U.S. military would have to find an acceptable
troop level for the American populous to tolerate and to fix a loss of credibility in a host nation.
Americans increased their tolerance of troop deployments as time went on, with the “Vietnam
syndrome” disappearing after the victory in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War victory, as explained
by President George Bush Sr. in his book, A World Transformed:
“The United States had recognized and shouldered its peculiar responsibility for leadership
in tackling international challenges, and won wide acceptance for this role around the
globe. American political credibility and influence had skyrocketed… Our military
credibility grew as well. US military forces and equipment operated in superb fashion…
The result was that we emerged from the Gulf conflict into a very different world from that
prior to the attack on Kuwait.”150
This change was witnessed in the regular large deployments of troops into the Middle East.
Going forward, the U.S. sought to find the right balance of local allied forces backed with
American military forces and training, funding, and weapon systems. This balance included
finding the right levels of American regular troops, special forces, and air power to guarantee
American accountability without falling into the trap of Americanization, as in Vietnam. The 2007
Iraq Surge would find a military temperature, as it were, that the American public would accept
and would dismantle the enemy’s insurgent network.
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The U.S. military commanded a leading global role after the Gulf War, as “A New World
Order” occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made the U.S. the sole global empire
from 1992 through 2007, with Washington D.C. relying on the military as its key to fixing
complicated global problems. Military interventions would become common in humanitarian
roles, which was exemplified in Somali, Haiti, and the Bosnian-Serbian conflict. The success
stories in El Salvador, Panama, and the Persian Gulf conflict fed a superiority complex in the U.S.
military and a belief reinforced by the American public, and from D.C., that the U.S. military was
now the simple, unstoppable solution to turbulent problems in foreign nations. This sentiment
produced a false mindset for continued conventional U.S. military dominance and success,
regardless of the circumstances it was introduced into. Counterinsurgency doctrines were
neglected, although situations in Iraq’s post-invasion bewildered the conventionally trained
military and forced a new evolutionary change in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.
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Chapter 5
Enemy Centric Versus Population Centric

“Terrorism is inseparable from its historical, political, and societal context, a context that
has both a local and a global dimension.”151
Audrey Cronin, How Terrorism Ends

September 11th, 2001 challenged the U.S.’s superiority complex after winning the Cold
War, as its invincibility became shattered. The twenty-first century now showed the glaring,
destructive capabilities of unconventional warfare through the use of low-grade weapons (a few
box cutters) combined with motivated individuals (19 hijackers) using civilian commercial
airliners for a coordinated attack with a devastating blow to the U.S. in a greater way than any
foreign conventional military force had done since WWII.152 President George W. Bush rallied the
American public in ways not seen since Pearl Harbor, and a common bond was forged between
Americans for a time. President Bush’s American public approval ratings swelled to near 90%,
and the U.S. Congress aligned behind his call for military interventions into Afghanistan in 2001
and Iraq in 2003.153 President Bush’s policies reflected the American public’s fervent desire to
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exact revenge on those who had attacked the nation. The world rallied around the American
people’s “quiet unyielding anger,”154 which sparked a series of American military interventions of
various aggressive proportions into Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and the
greater Sahel region. In addition to funding allies’ wars, including Saudi Arabia’s military
intervention into Yemen and the Philippine’s counterinsurgency operations in its southern island
chains, there was a nearly global effort to dismantle Al Qaida and their allies in regional and
international arenas.
A time of global campaigns focused on unconventional warfare arrived. These actions
opposed transnational terror networks, their financiers, and fighters, forcing the U.S. military to
adapt from a conventional focus of the 1990s to the “Global War on Terror” and its numerous
campaigns of counterinsurgency.155 Conventional means seemed to show signs of early success in
Afghanistan, where the U.S. military dismantled the operations of Al Qaida and their allies in the
Taliban, forcing them both to flee into Pakistan. In Iraq in 2003, in a little over a month, the Saddam
Regime was ended by a “shock and awe” campaign of conventional air and ground forces by
American and British forces.156 Although in quick succession in Iraq wide ranging insurgencies
developed, and conventional means were realized as not the means to success. The situation was
similar to the failure of the American Civil War with Reconstruction, as large conquering armies
of the U.S. joined with allied forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) quickly
found themselves harassed by invisible enemies after sweeping out the Saddam regime in Iraq.
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These forces were often hit with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, snipers,
and quick ambushes while interacting with a local population that was alien to them in religion,
custom, and language,157 the American public watched a spiraling and chaotic Iraq war effort grow
more deadly by the year; however, in Iraq in 2007, the U.S. military stopped this violent cycle.
This point of counterinsurgency success is my focus. Against the rising chaos reaching its
crescendo in 2006, it ended (for a time) with the 2007 surge, which was an American population
centric counterinsurgency campaign that ended the Sunni-Shia Civil War.158 In the “Global War
on Terror” campaign, the U.S. momentarily found the right ratio of American conventional and
special forces, along with NATO support, local Iraqi security forces, all backed with air power.159
This military concoction would be joined with a large aid programs for communities, focused
around community outreaches of Sunni-Shia reconciliation initiatives. With the careful hiring of
key Sunni and Shia militias focused to break up the militarized coalition that “Al Qaida in Iraq”
(AQI) had created against the American, NATO, and post-Saddam Iraqi government.160 The surge
forced the AQI insurgency, which had caused a tremendous amount of bloodshed and destruction
in Iraq, to go underground and relative peace to develop; however, AQI would reemerge,
rebranding itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
To provide some background on the conflict in Iraq and on the AQI insurgency’s origins,
we will look back before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, starting with the American Congress passing
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which “Declares that it should be the policy of the United States
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to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a
democratic government.”161 After September 11th,the American political and military leadership
rashly searched for connections between Iraq and Al Qaida. A weak plausible connection surfaced
in the northeast of Iraq, which housed a small Sunni terror cell, which was loosely in
communication with Al Qaida, led by an Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who was actively working to
produce cyanide and training fighters for terror attacks against Western targets.
On February 3, 2003, Secretary of State Collin Powell described Zarqawi’s terror cell
operations to the U.N. Security Council, explaining that it had ties to Saddam:
“what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus
between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist
organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network
headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his
Al Qaida lieutenants.”162
He explained further the belief in direct contacts between the two:
“Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar al-Islam,
which controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 this agent offered Al Qaida safe haven in the
region. After we swept Al Qaida from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted this safe
haven. They remain there today.”163
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He explained Saddam’s Iraqi government as a direct partner, “We are not surprised that Iraq is
harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades long experience
with respect to ties between Iraq and Al Qaida.”164 Invading the nation in a conventional war
seemed an easy fix that fit America’s strengths and toppled an erroneously believed key ally of Al
Qaida, which was argued to hinder a future September 11th attack. President Bush made clear in
his speech shortly after the September 11th attack that: “The search is under way for those
responsible for these evil acts… we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed
these acts and those who harbor them.”165
Political speeches from the White House cabinet members and the President were
reminiscent of the Red Scare, which used alarmist rhetoric about Iraq generating nuclear weapons
before and after the invasion. This rhetoric enflamed American public fears of a nuclear or
biological attack stemming from Iraq if not dealt with immediately. In a speech in Cincinnati on
October 7, 2002, not long before the conventional war, President Bush declared:
“Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing
clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could
come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962,
"Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate
deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small."
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Continuing he said, "We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons
represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril."166
Repeated reference to possible nuclear attacks continued and encouraged the American public to
support the military intervention which was striking similar to the Reagan rhetoric around El
Salvador of communist threats of invasion and attacks on the U.S. homeland. The tactic succeeded
in large part and a substantial number in the American public were shaken in their sense of security
following the September 11th attack, who placed their long-term political support behind President
Bush’s administration.
During the first days of the American invasion into Iraq, an initial failure occurred within
the U.S. military strategy. The U.S. military did not immediately seek to destroy Zarqawi, with his
known terror network’s locations, even though it had been a stated “reason” for invading Iraq. 167
American military assets were concentrated on conventional Iraqi forces, which gave Zarqawi time
to disappear into Iraq’s cities. Soon after the conventional war toppled the Iraqi regime, more
American errors aided Zarqawi. The U.S. concentrated its energy to form a new government for
the Iraqi nation in the image of the U.S. with Iraqi personnel that had been residing in the West.
These transplanted Iraqis from the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a U.S. funded organization,
worked to globally network Iraqi exiles and dissidents for the removal of Saddam. The INC’s
openly stated aim was to establish a democracy in Iraq after the regime’s fall and purge Iraq of
Baathists. With these Iraqis now in power, they worked in step with American officials and were
disconnected from the realities on the ground in Iraq. The nation had a failing economy, limited
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infrastructure, internal pent-up ethnic and religious rage in the populace, and a chaotic political
scene, which the new Iraqi government struggled to grasp. Neither the INC nor American officials
in charge understood the ethnic and religious powder keg that was about to erupt around them in
Iraq.
On May 15th, 2003, the American official put in charge of Iraq, L. Paul Brimmer,
acquiesced to a radical INC political position by disbanding the Iraqi Army (with over 250,000
Iraqis) and disqualifying the entire Baathist political party membership from political activity.168
This action prevented Baathists from playing any future role in the new Iraqi government, thereby
accomplishing the total removal and de-Baathification of Iraq’s governmental body. This instantly
threw out all top and lower-level politicians, teachers, and soldiers from their lifelong careers, and
this pool of military and governmental experience, containing many highly educated and
internationally networked people, were now all unemployed. This situation was added to a nation
that was experiencing a reported near 40% unemployment rate.169 Thrown out of careers onto the
streets, many would join AQI to rapidly form a well-staffed shadow government, with Zarqawi
rising as a leading figure. The former American Army General David Petraeus, who was tasked
with the 2007 Surge, described these early decisions: “that’s where the seeds of what became the
Sunni insurgency were largely planted.”170 This complicated web of political decisions in Iraq fed
the insurgency networks in Iraq to deadly effect going forward from 2003.
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Iraq spiraled out of control in 2004 on television for the world to see, which showed that
the Global War of Terror to be just beginning, and Americans would soon go to the polls for a
presidential election. In 2000, Bush had received 47.9% of the American vote representing over
fifty million votes, which was not a resounding victory in any form.171 In 2004, however, with
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Global War on Terror raging, President Bush received 50.7%
of the vote with over sixty-two million votes.172 A sufficient wave of American public confidence
had been given to President Bush, which he poured into expanding the U.S. military’s efforts in
this international conflict. With the increased vote, the Bush administration felt confident to
continue its use of far more aggressive tactics and strategies to fight the Global War on Terror.
The Bush administration thus increased American troop deployments to Afghanistan and
Iraq. Designated as “Boots on the ground,” these troops experienced tens of thousands of
casualties. The height of these troop levels reached “187,900 in FY2008 primarily because of
increases in Iraq” for the 2007 Surge.173 The American public watched and sustained a continued
belief in the wars, even as an anti-war movement arose; however, the anti-war movement was
never strong enough to break a core establishment of general American public support for the Iraq
war. Sufficient Republican and Democrat support persisted for the U.S. military’s troop/strategy
reconfiguring in the later 2007 Surge. In war correspondent Thomas Rick’s book called The
Gamble: General David Petraeus And The American Military Adventure In Iraq, he explains three
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key signs of continued American public support for the Iraq War which enabled the surge:174 first,
through the abysmal box office failures of Hollywood’s antiwar movies stocked with high level
actors, such as Valley of Elah, Grace is Gone, or Lions for Lambs which starred Tom Cruise and
Meryl Streep. Second, the antiwar movement that arose by 2008 at its height could barely garner
a few thousand marchers for a march on Washington D.C., and garnered far less for anti-war
protests elsewhere. Third, Democrats actions in Congress mirrored this recognition of a limited
American public antiwar sentiment. Democrat actions in the Senate would label the war, “Bush’s
War,” but would take no action to defund or stop the war. The Democrats understood that rhetoric
was all that the American public found acceptable.
President Bush rested his political strength on this continued American public support,
which permitted him to conduct special operations raids into Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, which
were joined with the creation of a fleet of arial drones, used to strike targets across the Middle
East.175 This was undergirded with the return of enhanced-interrogation techniques, which many
argued allowed the CIA to use torture as a means for extracting intelligence.176 This was linked to
the transferring detainees to allied nations that performed outright torture, and these methods of
attaining information would then be used for drone strikes or “kill and capture” raids by U.S.
special forces. The U.S. military sought to eliminate the shadow government in Iraq, and the Al
Qaeda trans-national partner organizations worldwide by an enemy-centric counterinsurgency.
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Though by 2006, a full-scale Iraqi civil war had erupted from the ethnic hatreds that had
laid suppressed during the brutal regime of Saddam.177 AQI had sought to openly slaughter the
Shia population using shootings and coordinated bombings of civilians to drive a national rift that
promoted a backlash of revenge killings against the Sunni communities with the aim to drive all
Sunnis to rally behind AQI for protection from the Shia communities, which largely succeeded.
The objective was to make AQI the perpetrator of cyclic violence and a savior for Sunni
communities in the civil war. These tactics by AQI became so deadly against civilians that even
Osama Bin Laden and his second in command, Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri contacted
Zarqawi, pressing him to stop targeting Muslims.178 The situation gave Al Qaida at large a mark
of brutality that was driving away other Islamic terror networks support, who sought to focus
attacks on Westerners, but to avoid open bloodbaths amongst the Muslim communities. This
overreach in brutality on the part of Zarqawi and his AQI affiliates began to isolate them both in
Iraq and internationally.
A profound debate started within the top military leadership in the White House about
ending the Iraqi cyclic violence, which was perceived to be ruining Iraq and isolating America in
Iraq. Due to the rise of the AQI insurgency and the civil war it had sparked, many NATO allies
and international aid organizations had left Iraq. AQI sought to isolate American forces, aiming to
put the entire weight of reconstruction, aid, and security onto American shoulders, which would
require them to abandon Iraq to the AQI, similar to what occurred in Vietnam. Preventing a
Vietnam-like fiasco became a top priority for the Bush administration, which soon the promoted a
“New Way Forward [in Iraq].” In a Foreign Policy article by Brett McGurk, a National Security
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Council member at the time, he highlighted the internal debate by noting that a top CIA
counterinsurgency expert had conducted an assessment showing that the presence of U.S. forces
was key to stability.179 McGurk states: "when we have a presence, we are able to help resolve local
disputes before they get out of control, stop illegal police conduct by Iraqi forces, and ultimately
help the Iraqis develop their own patterns of interaction,” this was a tough political sell.180 Some
argued to leave Iraq and saw placing more American forces into Iraq for the surge, roughly 28,000,
like a deadly doubling down, as President Johnson had done in Vietnam. An in-depth study of the
conflict and the Iraqi dilemma then occurred. With the continued support of the U.S.’s battered
allies from the U.K., Australian, and Canadian forces along with other allies staying in Iraq,
American forces were not isolated, as had occurred in Vietnam.
Army General Petraeus oversaw the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and with Marine
Lt. General James Mattis led the creation of a joint research team of military and civilian
researchers in a bid to develop a new military field manual for conducting counterinsurgency. In
a similar event to the early twentieth century’s USMC Small Wars Manual, a new military manual
for the 21st century arose. The Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency outlined for the U.S. and
NATO military field commanders a path forward in understanding the complexities of local
insurgencies. A “surge of new ideas” to stabilize Iraq began in policies, plans, and the orientation
of U.S. and British troops.181 Not only would there be a surge of additional American forces into
Iraq, but a complete overhaul of “on the ground” tactics and a reshuffling of Iraq’s national security
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strategy.182 The changes sought to reorganize coalition forces largely through commander and
warrior reeducation of how to fight and orient oneself in Iraq. The aim was for American forces to
develop positive interactions with Iraqis, where winning the Iraqi population’s “hearts and minds”
was the key step to gaining trust to help the coalition forces uncover the insurgent networks.183
The local Iraqis were viewed as the solution to receiving key tips in information to find the
insurgents, a new form of the doctrine of population-centric counterinsurgency arose as the
“Petraeus doctrine”. No longer would the U.S. military see the Iraqi population as the field to be
played on against the insurgents in enemy-centric counterinsurgency, which had led to large Iraqi
civilian deaths and U.S. isolation from the Iraqi public. Iraqi civilians were now the goal to be won
over in order to isolate the insurgent networks.184
American forces worked in close coordination with Iraqi forces by living and sleeping
together in the streets that they were assigned to patrol. No longer were coalition forces to be
housed in distant bases, searching the area during the day, only to leave a few hours later. This
routine gave the insurgents the night to coordinate, smuggle weapons and fighters, and specifically
allowing for the terrorizing of the locals and gave time for insurgents to plant IED’s for returning
American patrols in the morning. With the additional American forces buffered with Iraqi police
and soldiers, all forces would sleep where they worked. Coalition forces reclaimed the night and
made some local Iraqis feel more secure. Enough of the local population now saw that their fate
was better off with the coalition forces. Without the fear of insurgent reprisal, more locals shared
crucial tips on the AQI insurgency and helped direct the coalition forces to arrest insurgents and
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discover the insurgency’s routes for smuggling fighters and weapons. Equally importantly,
American forces were there to monitor and police the actions of the Iraqi forces. These tactics
aided in preventing reoccurring discrimination by the Iraqi government forces, which had alienated
the Iraqi people. The U.S. troop presence was the key to the Petraeus doctrine to gain local trust
across Iraq’s diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious communities by supporting good Iraqi
governance, because corruption and abuse had been fueling the conflict in many ways.
A fundamental flaw after 2003, however, was the Shia dominated political sphere,
pinnacled in the abusive Nouri al-Maliki Iraqi government, as corrupt Shia officials oversaw the
governing and policing of Sunni dominated zones. A top-down Shia government placed Shia in
positions of political power over many Sunni communities. Some of these Shia politicians, police,
and military commanders viewed it as their time to extract revenge on the Sunnis, even if they
were not former Baathists. This situation produced Shia night raiders of police and military death
squads, who haphazardly attacked and killed any suspected AQI members, arresting large numbers
of Sunnis and systematically torturing them.185 A loss of control like El Salvador was occurring.
Some Shia leaders and their forces were so isolated from the Sunni communities that they were
put in charge of that they adopted a siege mentality in isolated bases, becoming useless in the
policing of an area giving free reign to AQI activities.
This Iraqi divide along religious lines was understood and openly exploited by AQI, who
constantly enflamed tensions between the religious and ethnic communities, helping generate the
Shia governmental overreach in abuse, fear, and revenge killings, which perpetuated sectarian
violence. This situation prevented the nation from uniting in its fight against AQI. In 2006, the
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pinnacle of the Iraq civil war occurred when AQI bombed and destroyed the Al-Askari Mosque.186
The Al-Askari mosque was a key sacred Shia religious site. By the end of 2006, the conflict in
Iraq had a death toll of over 2,000 a month, with a devasting uptick in bombings and
assassinations.187 Dismantling the AQI militia coalitions perpetuating this violence became
critical. Many Sunnis were joining militias aligned with AQI for protection from the Shias due to
ethnic cleansing occurring in Iraqi neighborhoods. Coalition forces in the surge sought to separate
religious and ethnic communities, creating corridors of concrete walls to give room for community
leaders to talk. The goal was to reconcile the community leaders once the bloodshed had slowed.
Part of these talks involved the controversial release of popular militia leaders, many having killed
American troops but were now seen as being able to play a role in ending the violence through
careful negotiations, in order to break up the AQI support networks.188 An important Iraqi
reconciliation program was created called The Sons of Iraq, with the Sunni awakening, and a
delicate coalition of tribal Sheikhs, militia leaders, and community leaders of all religious and
ethnic communities was built.189 They were paid and aided by the coalition forces in an effort to
help properly police communities and stop the arbitrary killings between Iraq’s diverse
communities. With a stabilizing security situation under American troop supervision, it enabled a
calming of tensions and fear, which hid driven Sunnis to aid AQI against Shia communities.
For population-centric counterinsurgency to work, it is as much about military raids and
police work, as it is about establishing proper governance. Equal treatment under the law must be
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felt and understood by the populace, and economic futures must be brighter under government
leadership. Tied to the AQI insurgents being kept separate from the Iraqi public, to prevent
intimidation of the people. All these elements came together in the U.S.’s favor to win enough of
the Iraqi population to receive the needed intelligence and identify the insurgent networks. Once
the U.S. had the vision to see the insurgent threads that were creating the insurgent networks,
surgically dismantling the insurgency piece by piece occurred.
This population-centric counterinsurgency was also acceptable to the American public,
which enabled a dramatic increase of American forces into direct conflict with the insurgents. The
reason for creating a strategy that required more coalition forces, more American casualties, and
was more expensive, was due to the American public’s consistency in a political reelection of
President Bush. Surprisingly for the new counterinsurgency agenda to arise it was inseparably
linked to the 2006 mid-term swing to a Democrat political victory. By allowing President Bush to
remain in office, the public gave President Bush breathing room in not needing to seek reelection,
he saw after the 2006 mid-term election that drastic change in the Iraq counterinsurgency strategy
was needed due to the public’s rejection of the Republican party. President Bush acted on that
demand, changing the commanders in Iraq, and picking General Petraeus and his staff to lead a
dramatic change in the Iraq counterinsurgency effort. General Petraeus redirected the American
counterinsurgency doctrine away from the conventionally minded and military preferred kill
focused enemy-centric counterinsurgency to a course of Iraqi governance stabilization in a
population-centric approach. At the same time, Democrat political actions following 2006, showed
that they understood this American public desire for policy changes in the direction of the Iraq war
but not an outright rejection of the war. These events allowed room to see if the Petraeus doctrine’s
strategic and tactical changes would bear fruit. This understanding was shown in Democrat
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political inaction displaying a wider American public understanding for supporting for the Iraq
war effort. These developments point to the American public picking the new strategic and tactic
changes to the Petraeus doctrine going forward in Iraq, as much as the situational requirements on
the battlefield required them.
On September 10, 2007, General Petraeus and the American ambassador to Iraq, Ryan
Crocker, addressed the U.S. Congress on the successes and dilemmas in Iraq due the surge. The
number of attacks and overall deaths had steeply declined in most regions and success seemed the
overall message, although a warning was put forth at the end of Petraeus’s speech:
“A Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US
forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid
withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and
produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi
Security Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; Al Qaeda-Iraq [ISIS]
regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further
ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups
with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of
already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.”190
Success could only be sustained with a long-term American troop presence in Iraq. America had
to commit troops and keep the ethnically charged Iraqi government accountable, or the gains would
be lost.
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The success strategy and tactics of the surge, with its population-centric aim, would bear
much fruit for a time but failed with the 2011 American troop withdrawal.191 Iraq’s government
under the Shia strongman Malaki, returned to its old ways, defunding the Sons of Iraq, ending
community reconciliation efforts, refocusing government funds solely to Shia communities, and
stopping the scrutiny of Shia government officials abuses against Sunnis.192 This abuse and
corruption allowed for a reemergence of AQI, this time as ISIS, which rallied large portions of the
Sunni populations after 2011. ISIS thundered across Iraq and Syria in 2014 and led to over two
million people fleeing into Europe and over a half million being killed in ethnic cleansing and
violence by ISIS.193
American troops had to return, remaining there as of May 2021, with 2,500 U.S. service
members in Iraq.194 The gains and successes of America’s population-centric counterinsurgency
doctrine, required a long-term American troop overwatch of the local government actors until a
stable government body could become permanent. The weakness of population-centric doctrine
was that it required fair and effective local governance and failed without it. American officials
had trusted too quickly that the deep seated ethnic or religious conflicts in Iraqis would end.
American forces and international observers were necessary for decades in Iraq for a resolution to
take permanent root. America was learning that to keep the Iraqi peace America had to have a near
permanent troop presence in Iraq. Future presidents would not respect or understand that
America’s new commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan (or Libya) required a long-term troop
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commitment, just as in Japan, South Korea, or Kosovo. Today, America continues to provide
security in these regions, acting as a regional security foundation; however, removing the U.S.built security apparatus changed that regional foundation, which disrupted the region’s gains in
peace and effective governance.
2007 was a pivotal year internationally regarding the American military’s success in
population-centric counterinsurgency. With the end of 2007, a global shift in another region
transformed the global equation. Under President Vladimir Putin the Russian Federation
reemerged onto the world scene by invading Georgia in 2008.195 President Putin began the Russian
course of becoming a military alternative to the U.S. counterinsurgency narrative. The U.S. would
no longer be the only global empire with a counterinsurgent doctrine to share and emulate. Russia
was reemerging from its Cold War loss and wanted to give an alternative counterinsurgency
solution for nations to follow.
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Conclusion

“The power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.”196
Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth

I chose 2007 as the endpoint of this work because it fulfills my search of the U.S. military’s
counterinsurgency doctrinal evolution between two American field manuals as well as it also
shows the relationship of the American public’s will as a crucial source of the U.S. military’s
counterinsurgency doctrine creation. This American public will represents a key part of the
convoluted three-way conversation that together creates the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine I had
sought to understand, in my bid for the search for the catalyst of the writing of the USMC’s 1921
Small Wars manual and how the U.S. Army was led to create the Field Manual 3-24
Counterinsurgency. Starting at why did the U.S. have such counterinsurgency doctrinal needs?
And what drove their creation? I had carelessly believed in the past that the battlefield was the
main source of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrinal creation. Not understanding how complex the
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine creation was. This research took me to a far grander exploration
of U.S. history than I had originally planned. Exploring the foundational documents, predecessors’
ideas, and the human elements that flowed through them, it showed a grand American narrative,
which had worked to transform the United States of America into a global empire, which required
the U.S. to begin developing its counterinsurgency doctrine and develop it further over the U.S’s
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historical global interactions. For a moment, America fulfilled its foundational goal of becoming
the sole global empire. The U.S. won the global imperial race that it entered in 1788 when, on
December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union broke apart.
Developments past 2007 made this victory short-lived, by 2008, many of the U.S.’s
grandiose hopes and beliefs of the 1990s were crushed. The global imperial race was not over, and
America was not the sole world hegemon from here on out. It was not “the end of history,” and
democratic rule was not perpetually assured.197 2007, saw the successful implementation of a U.S.
military counterinsurgency doctrine, but it quickly showed that the U.S. was not to remain the sole
counterinsurgency doctrinal leader. Competitors were on the rise, recovering from their twentieth
century losses, and international rivals were emerging who had their own aims and ethos on human
rights, and visions on how to achieve their global influence.
Many nations viewed the fickleness of the American public as a liability, and Russia
reemerged as a global alternative to America’s counterinsurgency support. Many have pointed to
Russia’s small economy, being nearly the size of Spain’s, as an argument to disregard their
international competitiveness to the U.S. influence.198 A nation’s gross domestic product does not
guarantee one’s impact on the world, however, and Russia is actively involved in counterinsurgent
campaigns in Syria, Libya, and the Center African Republic (CAR). The government of Mali is in
talks to bring Russian military advisors to aid in their counterinsurgent operations against ISIS

Yascha Mounk, “The End of History Revisited.” Journal of Democracy, January 2020,
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-end-of-history-revisited/.
198
Jim Edwards. “Russia's Economy Has Shrunk So Much It's Now Almost The Same Size As
Spain.” Business Insider, December 2, 2014, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economygdp-v-spain-201412#:~:text=Spain%3A%20Russia%20has%20lost%20its%20ranking%20as%20the,feeble%20ec
onomies%2C%20with%201%20in%204%20Spaniards%20unemployed.
197

93
aligned organizations.199 The world watched during the Syrian civil war as Russian planes carpet
bombed whole cities, forcing millions to flee to Europe.200 Using brutality as a weapon and not
only against Syrian civilians, but these tactics also sought to use mass migrations into Europe to
sow chaos and internal political upheaval within its European competitors. Russia allowed its
Syrian ally to use chemical weapons, which recalled back to many older strategies of Soviet
operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s, which killed millions.201 This Russian counterinsurgency
doctrine of annihilation was allowed, because the U.S. was not willing to intervene in Syria in
2013. Even after President Barack Obama said that the U.S. had a “Red Line” for American
intervention if chemical weapons were used, Russia and Syria watched as this line was drawn and
broken, followed by American military actions being canceled by President Obama.202 Nations
took notice as America stepped back from its global military leadership role, disastrously allowing
another international competitor to outcompete the American military.
President Obama approved a U.S. led and NATO supported air campaign to help remove
the Libyan dictator, Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi, not wanting to see another “Red Line” failure with
perceived U.S. inaction.203 President Obama preformed a half measure by not sending any sizeable
ground troops to help stabilize a new Libyan government. In quick fashion Libya was wrecked
with rival militia infighting from economic insolvency which paralyzed the new Libyan
government’s actions. President Obama’s decision allowed for the unmitigated growth of ISIS in
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the eastern portion of Libya. A U.S. catastrophe in Benghazi soon occurred, which again
highlighted American inaction, even when U.S. citizens and their ambassador were in danger.
American power was lacking in the will to act, continuing to recede post-2011. Today, Russian
forces through the pseudo-mercenary company the Wagner Corporation, aid the eastern Libyan
portion of the nation under General Khalifa Haftar.204 Haftar is supported with Russian mercenary
forces in air, artillery, and infantry troops. At the same time in the CAR, Russia has sent military
advisors and Wagner Corporation forces to aid the nation in its western zones with Islamic
insurgents.205 These activities have led to mounting allegations of crimes against humanity by way
of summary executions, rape, and the destruction of entire villages. These Russian led
counterinsurgency operations have again fomented the mass migration of traumatized peoples,
strikingly like the strategies and tactics used in Syria. These Russian types of annihilation strategies
and tactics in counterinsurgency are spreading in international popularity.
France has reengaged in parts of the African Sahel, seen in Chad, the CAR, Mali, Côte
d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, after the devasting ISIS terror attacks in Paris in November of 2015.206
The French have sought to employ an American styled population-centric counterinsurgency
campaign, which has shown progress and success against ISIS aligned militants, although France
has limited forces and resources that it can employ. Nations such as Mali and the CAR are turning
to Russian influences and styles of harsh brutal doctrines for faster results, sensing the French as
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a faltering Western ally. This turning away from America and Western engagements is due in large
part to the U.S. receding in its use of military forces.
I lay this retreat on the American public’s will, which have become tired of their global
responsibilities. America had obtained the title of the sole surviving global empire from the
twentieth century but now, like a seasoned champion, has lost that hunger for global engagement.
This shift by the U.S. is creating a world where the more time consuming and expensive doctrine
of population-centric counterinsurgency is being discarded for the cheaper, harsher, and devasting
doctrines of annihilation currently advocated by the Russians.
The Russians are not the sole example of another type of brutal counterinsurgency doctrine.
China has also entered this global counterinsurgency competition by reasserting itself as a global
power to be emulated for domestic rule. It has developed a brutal internal (domestic)
counterinsurgency, whereas the Russians are showing their military power externally. China has
articulated that to stop Islamic terrorism in its western regions, it must crack down internally.207
Today, millions of Chinese Muslims, the ethnic Uighurs, find themselves in concentration camps
experiencing forced reeducation, forced renunciation of their religion, mass sterilization, and
systematic rape of women.208 The Chinese have in their Western region, employed DNA tests to
find ethnic communities, and their sole crime is not being Han Chinese enough.209 China has
pioneered the use of AI technology in their nationwide surveillance networks. If the AI determines
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you do not appear to be properly Han Chinese, they are seized and sent to a concentration camp.210
This forced population movement and sterilization campaign are an amplified style of the
annihilation counterinsurgency strategies and tactics of the 19th century.
Nations are seeing the success of the brutal crushing of ethnic or religious minorities in
China, which has garnered many nations in the world to condemn China but who are slow to truly
act against China, due to China’s growing economic influence. This influence is pinnacled in
China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which is moving other nations ever deeper into the
Chinese orbit of political influence and economic control.211 China is seeking to economically tie
itself through roads, seaports, airports, rail, and massive loans to Asia, Africa and into Europe.
This Chinese economic success is leading to China’s internal counterinsurgency methods
spreading abroad. Exampled by China’s support for their ally Myanmar, China did not bat an eye
as Myanmar’s democratic government was overthrown by a military junta. Today, Myanmar
executes a policy of extermination against internal dissenters and ethnic minorities.212 These
aggressive events are strikingly like China’s internal actions; and I believe Myanmar will not be
the last to emulate Chinese counterinsurgency doctrines.
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The world is becoming again a multi-narrative counterinsurgency competition, and the
days of the 1990s of sole Western or American influence, are over. The U.S. military must become
competitive to these alternative doctrines and assertive in military force with allies that seek
military cooperation.

America must

effectively

market

U.S.

military doctrines

of

counterinsurgency. American troops must be allowed to fight in a rapid response, provide
development aid, and train allied armies. To apply the U.S. military in this fashion is the only way
I see to properly compete to stop the current global turn to the doctrines of annihilation. America
must realize that the aid and training from Russia and China is in direct opposition to our ethics in
human rights and doctrines of counterinsurgency. This does not account for other competitors that
are regional powers, such as Iran. Russia has shown a will to train, provide aid, and send forces to
any ally in the world be it Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, the CAR, Syria, Libya, and others. This gives
great credibility to Russia’s word and deed, which contrasts with American military withdrawals.
New theaters are arising that will test American resolve or its continued retreat of security
agreements, which I see exampled in the self-described, independent island nation of Taiwan.
China seeks to actively reclaim Taiwan, describing it as a “break away territory.”213 Nations will
flock to China’s influence as they see China’s aggression unchecked. America’s words of
protection must be backed up by deeds for nations to emulate our values. World opinion is only
part of the equation.
I contend after writing this thesis that it is the American public’s will that must be crucially
won over for the U.S. to renew its place as the global counterinsurgency provider. The American
public must understand that America plays an enormous role in international stability. The post-
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2011 steps of American withdrawal, which was further exasperated by the 1930s like isolation
actions of former President Donald Trump must be rejected, showing the dangerous world it allows
and the increased influence it gives to our competitors. Americans today have such a poor
interpretation of their international responsibilities. This mindset brings about the failure of the
U.S. to market its counterinsurgency doctrine effectively internally. America has the technology,
the experience, and the global network to aid and develop population-centric counterinsurgency in
allied nations. What is needed is a marketing of the successful, and more humane campaigns of
population-centric counterinsurgency at home to Americans, for it be able to operate abroad. What
we lack is the will of the American public today. I lay the failure on the state schools and federal
government for not articulating in any effective fashion America’s role in the world to win the
American public’s heart for action. America has an exceptionally influential role to play in this
competition of doctrines that no other Western nation can fill or supply at this moment.
It has taken world wars and international conflicts to create a global American military
machine which can act in this vital role, having required the blood of many American warriors,
who have shown the errors and truths in the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines. America has the
economy to aid failing states in providing effective governance, training humane military
practices, and holding nations accountable through sizeable American political and an appropriate
military troop presence, until their populations can hold their leadership accountable from the
ballet box. Americans, deep down, want to play a significant role in the world. They can sense that
their nation is unique. They know it is powerful and influential. They internally know it has an
ethical basis and foundation. We need to teach Americans and provide a vision for each citizen to
contribute to this role for sustaining and building this world order we desire. It is required of the
American people to uphold that ethos if we desire to see it continue in the world. This takes me
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back to a common phrase, with great power, comes great responsibility. America today is dropping
the ball in its global responsibility in being a counterinsurgency enabler and leader. America is
allowing inhumane competitors in Russia and China to now take the global counterinsurgency lead
from itself.
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Author’s Note
I began this journey in 2015, when I served in an active role in the Global War on Terror.
I wanted to understand the role that I and my three brothers had played in our USMC deployments,
at times to combat zones in Iraq and Syria. On my deployment in 2015, with the 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit to the Middle East, I was a cannoneer for a M777 Howitzer section. This
experience stirred my desire and internal mission to learn about what America was and what role
it played in the world. It has taken nine years of real-world experience, international traveling, and
long hours of research, to find a general understanding, which I share in this thesis. I still lack a
full handle on this international behemoth of the American empire’s responsibility. I am today still
proud to wear a uniform for the United States of America, as I recognize America’s ability to learn,
change, and develop increasingly ethical doctrines for U.S. military operations. There are
improvements and reforms to be done, but our history shows we can change. I desire to play a
growing role in that positive trajectory and influence in future U.S. military doctrinal
developments. As an ambassador for my nation and U.S. ethos internationally, I aim to help to
dismantle and oppose destructive and ghastly doctrines of annihilation that are propagated and
used today by our competitors, with the hope that others will do the same.
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